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THE INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE 
DOCTRINE 
Michael T. Morley* 
 
The U.S. Constitution grants authority to both regulate congressional 
elections and determine the manner in which a state chooses its presidential 
electors specifically to the legislature of each state, rather than to the state 
as an entity.  The independent state legislature doctrine teaches that, because 
a legislature derives its power over federal elections directly from the 
Constitution in this manner, that authority differs in certain important 
respects from the legislature’s general police powers that it exercises under 
the state constitution.  Although the doctrine was applied on several 
occasions in the nineteenth century, it largely fell into desuetude in the years 
that followed.  During the 2020 presidential election cycle, however, several 
Justices issued opinions demonstrating an interest in recognizing and 
enforcing the doctrine. 
This Article contends that the doctrine is best understood as a general 
principle that gives rise to a range of different potential corollaries, each of 
which is supported by somewhat differing lines of precedent, reasoning, 
historical practice, and prudential considerations.  Each of these potential 
implications of the doctrine may be assessed separately from the others; the 
doctrine need not be accepted or repudiated wholesale.  The fact that a court 
or commentator may accept or reject certain applications of the doctrine 
does not mean that other aspects, or the doctrine as a whole, must be 
similarly embraced or jettisoned.  This Article unpacks the independent state 
legislature doctrine, exploring and offering a normative perspective on each 
of its possible corollaries. 
 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 502 
I.  THE DOCTRINE AND STATE STATUTES ......................................... 508 
A.  Requiring State Law Authorization for Other Branches’ 
Actions ............................................................................ 509 
 
*  Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law.  This Article was prepared 
for the Symposium entitled Toward Our 60th Presidential Election, hosted by the Fordham 
Law Review on February 26, 2021, at Fordham University School of Law.  I am grateful for 
the valuable feedback I received at the Symposium.  Special thanks to Mary Hornak, Tatiana 
Hyman, Joseph Palandrani, and the staff of the Fordham Law Review for their tireless help in 
editing this piece, and to Anna Kegelmeyer for her outstanding research assistance. 
 
502 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
B.  Interpreting State Laws Governing Federal Elections ..... 515 
C.  Barring Federal Review Under the Political Question 
Doctrine .......................................................................... 532 
II.  THE DOCTRINE AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS .............................. 535 
A.  Substantive Restrictions on Legislatures’ Authority ......... 536 
B.  Procedural Restrictions on Legislatures’ Authority ......... 541 
III.  THE DOCTRINE AND STATE LEGISLATURES ............................... 542 
A.  Direct Legislative Appointment of Presidential Electors . 542 
B.  Regulating Federal Elections Outside of Institutional 
Legislatures .................................................................... 549 
C.  Stripping Institutional Legislatures of Authority to Regulate 
Federal Elections ............................................................ 552 
D.  Delegation of Legislative Authority over Federal  
Elections ......................................................................... 554 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 555 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2020 presidential election was the most litigated in American history.  
Prior to Election Day, plaintiffs across the nation had collectively filed over 
400 federal and state challenges to various election-related rules and 
procedures.1  Many of these cases alleged that states had not done enough to 
ensure that people could vote safely despite the ongoing global COVID-19 
pandemic.2  Following the election, President Donald J. Trump and his 
supporters filed dozens of additional federal and state lawsuits, 
unsuccessfully attempting to challenge the election’s results.3 
One issue that arose in some of these cases was the viability of the 
“independent state legislature doctrine.”  This doctrine teaches that a state 
legislature’s power to regulate federal elections does not arise from its state 
 
 1. See COVID-Related Election Litigation Tracker, STANFORD-MIT HEALTHY 
ELECTIONS PROJECT, https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/ [https://perma.cc/ 
EM99-9UYD] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021); see also Lila Hassan & Dan Glaun, COVID-19 
and the Most Litigated Presidential Election in Recent U.S. History:  How the Lawsuits Break 
Down, PBS FRONTLINE (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/covid-19-
most-litigated-presidential-election-in-recent-us-history/ [https://perma.cc/6B7X-L8QX]. 
 2. See, e.g., Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 977 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2020) 
(declining to stay an injunction against a state law that required people who registered to vote 
online or by mail to cast their first ballot in person); Common Cause R.I. v. Gorbea, 970 F.3d 
11 (1st Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (declining to stay a consent decree suspending witness 
requirements for mail-in ballots), stay denied sub nom. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Common 
Cause R.I., 141 S. Ct. 206 (2020) (mem.), appeal dismissed, No. 20-1753, 2020 WL 8299593 
(1st Cir. Aug. 17, 2020). 
 3. See William Cummings et al., By the Numbers:  President Donald Trump’s Failed 
Efforts to Overturn the Election, USA TODAY (Jan. 6, 2021, 10:50 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/elections/2021/01/06/trumps-failed-
efforts-overturn-election-numbers/4130307001/ [https://perma.cc/PT7H-VWD2]; Jim 
Rutenberg et al., Trump’s Fraud Claims Died in Court, but the Myth of Stolen Elections Lives 
On, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/26/us/politics/republicans-
voter-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/EL7W-HR3B]. 
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constitution (like most of the legislature’s other powers) but rather from an 
independent grant of authority directly from the U.S. Constitution.  The 
doctrine is rooted in the fact that states lack inherent authority to regulate 
federal elections; their only power over such elections comes from the U.S. 
Constitution.4 
Rather than delegating power to regulate federal elections to each state as 
an entity, the U.S. Constitution confers it specifically upon each state’s 
legislature.  The Article I Elections Clause provides, “The Times, Places and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof,” although Congress may 
“make or alter” such rules “at any time.”5  Likewise, the Article II 
Presidential Electors Clause states, “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner 
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors” to select the 
president.6  One might say that the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors 
Clause “pierce the veil” of statehood, conferring certain powers on a 
particular organ of state government rather than the state as an entity. 
The question then arises:  what, if any, significance should we attribute to 
this constitutional language?  The independent state legislature doctrine 
provides that, because a legislature derives its authority over federal elections 
from the U.S. Constitution, such authority differs in certain important 
respects from the legislature’s general police powers under its state 
constitution.  Commentators strenuously disagree over the precise nature of 
any such differences and, indeed, whether they exist at all.7 
It appears that the Framers neither expressly considered the independent 
state legislature doctrine nor addressed the potential significance of their use 
of the term “legislature” in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors 
Clause.8  The doctrine was nevertheless invoked on multiple occasions in the 
nineteenth century by the chambers of Congress, state supreme courts, and 
even the U.S. Supreme Court.9  Additionally, the doctrine was endorsed by 
Michigan Supreme Court Justice Thomas M. Cooley in his treatise on 
 
 4. See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 
514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 6. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 7. See, e.g., Robert A. Schapiro, Conceptions and Misconceptions of State Constitutional 
Law in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 661, 672 (2001) (arguing that the doctrine “does 
not rest on firm foundations of text, precedent, or history”); Hayward H. Smith, History of the 
Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 764–75 (2001) 
(arguing that the independent state legislature doctrine lacks a valid historical foundation); see 
also infra note 121 (collecting sources); cf. Vikram David Amar, The People Made Me Do It:  
Can the People of the States Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislatures in the Article V 
Constitutional Amendment Process?, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037, 1041, 1074 (2000) 
(contending that Article V allows a state’s citizens to prevent agency problems by restricting 
or directing the institutional legislature’s actions concerning federal constitutional 
amendments). 
 8. See Michael T. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal 
Elections, and State Constitutions, 55 GA. L. REV. 1, 27–37 (2020). 
 9. See id. at 8–9, 37–69. 
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constitutional law10 and emphasized by Justice Joseph Story at the 
Massachusetts constitutional convention of 1820.11 
Though some courts continued to apply the doctrine into the early 
twentieth century,12 it fell into desuetude, its historical background 
minimized or forgotten.13  One strand of the doctrine, however, played a 
critical role in the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment,14 which 
extended the franchise to women.15  A unanimous Supreme Court invoked 
another aspect of the doctrine in the course of resolving the 2000 presidential 
election,16 while at least four Justices recognized its validity in separate 
opinions in Bush v. Gore itself.17  In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has adopted inconsistent views toward the doctrine.  The Court’s hotly 
contested 5–4 ruling in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission18 repudiated the doctrine (albeit arguably partly in 
dicta).19  Several Justices subsequently issued opinions embracing it in cases 
arising from the 2020 presidential election.20 
 
 10. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 754 n.1 (6th ed. 
1890). 
 11. JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES, CHOSEN 
TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS 109–12 (Boston Daily Advertiser rev. ed. 
1853) [hereinafter MASS. JOURNAL]; see also Morley, supra note 8, at 38–40 (discussing the 
debate at the convention). 
 12. See, e.g., State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 34 N.W.2d 279, 285–87 (Neb. 1948) (holding 
that the court need not consider whether state laws establishing ballot access requirements for 
presidential candidates violated the state constitution because the state constitution did not 
apply to laws concerning the appointment of presidential electors); Commonwealth ex rel. 
Dummit v. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691, 694–96 (Ky. 1944) (holding that the state constitution 
likely could not restrict the state legislature’s power to allow members of the military to cast 
absentee ballots in presidential elections); Parsons v. Ryan, 60 P.2d 910, 912 (Kan. 1936) 
(“We are not persuaded by the argument that the enactment of election laws, being an exercise 
of police power, is subject to [state] constitutional restrictions which prevent the Legislature 
from limiting the right of candidates to have their names on the general ballot.  As has been 
shown, the Federal Constitution commands the state Legislature to direct the manner of 
choosing electors.”). 
 13. See Morley, supra note 8, at 9 n.24. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 15. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922) (holding that a state legislature’s 
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment was valid pursuant to its authority under Article V 
of the U.S. Constitution, despite the state constitution’s purported restrictions); cf. Hawke v. 
Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227, 230–31 (1920) (invoking the independent state legislature doctrine 
to uphold the validity of the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, which established 
Prohibition). 
 16. See Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam). 
 17. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam); see infra notes 112–20 and accompanying text. 
 18. 576 U.S. 787 (2015). 
 19. Id. at 824. 
 20. See Republican Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 732, 732–33 (2021) (mem.) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“The Constitution gives to each state 
legislature authority to determine the ‘Manner’ of federal elections.  Yet both before and after 
the 2020 election, nonlegislative officials in various States took it upon themselves to set the 
rules instead.” (internal citation omitted)); id. at 738 (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari); Republican Party of Pa. v. Boockvar (Boockvar II), 141 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2020) (Alito, 
J., concurring in denial of motion to expedite consideration of petition for certiorari) (“The 
provisions of the Federal Constitution conferring on state legislatures, not state courts, the 
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This Article seeks to unpack the independent state legislature doctrine, 
explaining the range of distinct possible implications to which courts, 
commentators, and advocates have claimed it gives rise.  Importantly, these 
possible corollaries of the doctrine are largely independent of each other, 
supported by somewhat different lines of reasoning and authority.  Although 
these theories arise from the same constitutional principle, each may be 
assessed separately from the others; the doctrine need not be accepted or 
repudiated wholesale.  The fact that a court or commentator may reject 
certain potential implications of the doctrine does not mean that other 
possible applications, or the doctrine as a whole, must also be jettisoned.  
This Article also offers a normative perspective on each of these possible 
implications, assessing the extent to which each is historically supported, 
legally sound, and pragmatically desirable. 
Part I focuses on the independent state legislature doctrine’s potential 
implications for state statutes.  Most basically, because the doctrine 
emphasizes the Constitution’s grant of authority over federal elections to 
state legislatures, a few courts have interpreted the doctrine as requiring state 
and local officials to be able to point to some source of statutory authorization 
for the policies they adopt or restrictions they enforce for such elections.  
Under this approach, when election officials act without, or contrary to, 
statutory authorization regarding federal elections, they not only violate state 
law but also intrude on the legislature’s prerogatives under the U.S. 
Constitution.  This aspect of the doctrine simply adds an additional—and, 
critics might charge, unnecessary—federal overlay to the question of whether 
election officials are acting ultra vires under state law. 
A more consequential potential implication is that the doctrine may impose 
a plain meaning canon of interpretation for state laws governing federal 
elections, and may allow federal courts to review state courts’ interpretations 
of such provisions to prevent substantial unexpected departures from their 
text.  This prong of the doctrine provides that, because the Constitution grants 
state legislatures the authority to regulate federal elections, election officials 
and courts must follow the rules the legislature establishes.  Under this 
approach, since a legislature adopts only the text of a statute, the Constitution 
requires election officials and courts to apply that text, even if they ordinarily 
would take into account extrinsic considerations like the state constitution, 
 
authority to make rules governing federal elections would be meaningless if a state court could 
override the rules adopted by the legislature simply by claiming that a state constitutional 
provision gave the courts the authority to make whatever rules it thought appropriate for the 
conduct of a fair election.”); Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46, 47–48 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting from denial of injunction pending appeal) (opining that a state board of elections 
had violated the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause by executing a consent 
decree in state court that barred enforcement of a law recently enacted by the legislature to 
regulate elections during the COVID-19 pandemic); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State 
Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 29–30 (2020) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in denial of 
application to vacate stay) (declining to vacate a stay of a federal district court order extending 
the deadline for the receipt of absentee ballots by election officials because “[t]he Constitution 
provides that state legislatures—not federal judges, not state judges, not state governors, not 
other state officials—bear primary responsibility for setting election rules”). 
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substantive canons of interpretation, or their own judgments about sound 
policy or fairness. 
At a minimum, this aspect of the doctrine would place outer bounds on the 
ability of state officials and courts to unexpectedly interpret a state law 
governing federal elections in a way that materially deviates from the 
apparent meaning of that law’s text.  In particular, a state court would be 
unable to effectively change the rules of an election—especially after the 
votes have been cast and the beneficiaries of various possible rulings are 
known—by interpreting and applying the election code in dubious and 
unpredictable ways.  Although the Erie doctrine generally requires federal 
courts to accept state courts’ interpretations of state statutes,21 the Supreme 
Court has recognized multiple exceptions to that principle, particularly when 
important federal interests are involved.22  A unanimous Supreme Court 
appears to have applied this aspect of the doctrine in Bush v. Palm Beach 
County Canvassing Board,23 and at least four Justices acknowledged it, albeit 
to varying extents, in Bush v. Gore.24 
This part concludes by explaining how a few federal courts have 
erroneously held that, under the political question doctrine, the Elections 
Clause and Presidential Electors Clause preclude them from adjudicating 
certain kinds of constitutional challenges to state laws regulating federal 
elections.  Those constitutional provisions, however, do not speak to the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  This potential application of the doctrine is 
among the most easily rejected. 
Part II turns to the independent state legislature doctrine’s possible 
implications for state constitutions.  During the nineteenth century, the 
doctrine was invoked on multiple occasions to establish that, because a state 
legislature receives its authority to regulate federal elections exclusively 
from the U.S. Constitution, a state constitution is incapable of imposing 
substantive restrictions on the scope of that power.25  When a state legislature 
regulates federal elections, it is bound by the implicit restrictions of the 
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause;26 the explicit restrictions 
of the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights (as incorporated through the 
Fourteenth Amendment), Reconstruction amendments,27 and other voting 
 
 21. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 22. See infra notes 135–87 and accompanying text. 
 23. 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam); see infra notes 96–110 and accompanying text. 
 24. See 531 U.S. 98, 111–22 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 129–35 (Souter, 
J., dissenting); see also infra notes 112–20 and accompanying text (discussing the Rehnquist 
and Souter opinions’ analyses). 
 25. See Morley, supra note 8, at 9–10; see also supra note 12 (collecting cases). 
 26. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833–34 (1995) (holding that 
the Elections Clause does not empower states to adopt laws that “dictate electoral 
outcomes, . . . favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or . . . evade important constitutional 
restraints”); see, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001) (enforcing the Elections 
Clause’s implicit limitations recognized in Thornton); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 
U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983) (noting that states may enact “generally applicable and evenhanded 
restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the [federal] electoral process itself”). 
 27. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); 
id. amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race). 
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rights amendments;28 and federal laws such as the Voting Rights Act of 
196529 and National Voter Registration Act of 1993.30  This prong of the 
independent state legislature doctrine specifies that a legislature is not 
similarly bound by substantive constraints in its state constitution.  Since 
most state constitutional provisions concerning voting rights either have 
analogues in the U.S. Constitution or state law, or are construed substantively 
similarly to more general provisions in the U.S. Constitution (like the Due 
Process or Equal Protection Clauses),31 this principle typically would have 
limited effect.32  One important consequence would be the preclusion of 
voters from challenging alleged political gerrymanders for the U.S. House of 
Representatives under state constitutions. 
Even if the doctrine precludes state constitutions from limiting the 
substantive content of the laws that legislatures enact to regulate federal 
elections, state constitutions still may regulate the process by which 
legislatures enact those measures into law.  Historically, bills concerning 
federal elections were subject to the possibility of rejection through a 
gubernatorial veto33 or public referendum.34   
Part III focuses on the doctrine’s potential impacts on the legislature itself.  
Historically, some legislatures exercised their authority under the 
Presidential Electors Clause by directly appointing presidential electors.35  
This part begins by assessing claims that legislatures may continue to assert 
such power, despite the transition to popular presidential elections.  Strong 
arguments can be made under the Constitution and federal law that, once a 
legislature establishes a process to choose electors by popular vote, it may 
not supersede that process by directly appointing its own slate of electors in 
violation of its own laws—at least absent a major disaster such as Hurricane 
Katrina that prevents a popular election from being conducted or completed.  
Moreover, a legislature’s attempt to assert such authority would be 
dangerously destabilizing to the electoral process. 
Turning to a different potential application of the doctrine, this part then 
examines whether it prevents states from enacting measures governing 
federal elections through mechanisms outside the institutional legislature, 
such as a public initiative process.36  This part goes on to assess the related 
 
 28. See, e.g., id. amend. XIX (prohibiting sex discrimination with regard to voting rights); 
id. amend. XXIV, § 1 (abolishing poll taxes for federal elections); id. amend. XXVI, § 1 
(prohibiting discrimination on account of age, for people at least 18 years old, with regard to 
voting rights); see also id. amend. XVII (providing for the popular election of U.S. senators). 
 29. Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 
U.S.C.). 
 30. Pub. L. No. 103–31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511 
and in scattered sections of 39 U.S.C.). 
 31. See Michael T. Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 189, 204 (2014). 
 32. See Morley, supra note 8, at 90–92. 
 33. See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 372–73 (1932). 
 34. See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916). 
 35. See EDWARD B. FOLEY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND MAJORITY RULE 59 (2020). 
 36. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 824 
(2015). 
508 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
issue of whether states may partly or completely strip their institutional 
legislatures of authority to regulate federal elections.37  At a minimum, the 
doctrine suggests that, even if such alternate legislative methods 
presumptively may be used to regulate federal elections, they may not limit 
the institutional legislature’s authority under the U.S. Constitution to adopt 
its own preferred policies.  Finally, this part rejects the notion that the 
independent state legislature doctrine prevents state legislatures from 
delegating their constitutional authority to other entities, such as election 
officials. 
A brief conclusion follows, explaining how standing requirements may 
hinder attempts by candidates, voters, and most other potential plaintiffs to 
invoke the independent state legislature doctrine.38  Much of the legal and 
academic debate over the doctrine has been complicated by the fact that it 
has a range of potential applications.  The doctrine’s validity, however, does 
not hinge on any particular application.  And not all of those potential 
corollaries are consistent with the way the doctrine has historically been 
implemented or pragmatically beneficial.  This Article seeks to provide a 
descriptive taxonomy of the doctrine’s possible applications, with a 
normative assessment of their relative merits. 
I.  THE DOCTRINE AND STATE STATUTES 
The independent state legislature doctrine arises from the fact that the 
Constitution grants authority to regulate the “Manner” of conducting 
congressional elections39 and appointing presidential electors40 specifically 
to the “Legislature” of each state rather than to the state as a whole.  Since 
the Constitution singles out state legislatures, it is helpful to begin by 
considering whether it requires any special treatment for state laws governing 
federal elections that a legislature enacts.  This part begins by explaining how 
some courts have held that it is unconstitutional for state or local election 
officials to purport to regulate federal elections without statutory 
authorization.  It then explores how the doctrine has been applied to impose 
outer bounds on courts’ ability to interpret state laws governing federal 
elections in surprising ways that materially depart from their text.  From this 
perspective, the greater the inconsistency between a statute’s text and a 
court’s interpretation of it, the greater the risk that the court is imposing its 
own preferences rather than faithfully implementing the legislature’s 
directives and respecting the legislature’s constitutional prerogatives. 
 
 37. Cf. id. 
 38. See Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (per curiam) (holding that private 
citizens lacked standing to bring a challenge under the Elections Clause to a state court’s order 
concerning congressional redistricting, because they could assert only an “undifferentiated, 
generalized grievance”). 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 40. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
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A.  Requiring State Law Authorization for Other Branches’ Actions 
The most basic potential implication of the independent state legislature 
doctrine is that state and local officials must be able to point to some source 
of statutory authorization to impose measures regulating federal elections.  
Under this approach, the Constitution grants power over federal elections 
specifically to the state legislature.  Election officials may therefore adopt 
rules or procedures concerning such elections only if the legislature has 
authorized them to do so.  And officials may not take it upon themselves to 
suspend or ignore state law.  An election official who purports to act without 
some delegation of authority from the legislature or attempts to adopt rules 
that suspend or contradict a legislative enactment is not only acting ultra vires 
under state law but also intruding on the legislature’s sole constitutional 
prerogatives, as well. 
For example, in Libertarian Party v. Dardenne,41 the final statutory 
deadline for recognized political parties to file their nominees with the 
Louisiana secretary of state was September 5.42  Hurricane Gustav had hit 
the state only a few days earlier, however, and the secretary’s office “was 
officially closed” from September 2 through September 7.43  When the office 
reopened on September 8, the secretary announced that he was extending the 
filing deadline until the end of that day.44  Because the Libertarian Party was 
unable to submit its completed paperwork until two days later, the secretary 
declared that he would be excluding the party’s candidate for president from 
the ballot.45 
Applying the independent state legislature doctrine, the U.S. District Court 
for the Middle District of Louisiana held that the secretary had violated the 
Presidential Electors Clause by unilaterally establishing a new deadline 
without any statutory basis.46  The court began by noting that “only the 
legislative branch has the authority, under Articles I and II of the United 
States Constitution, to prescribe the manner of electing candidates for federal 
office.”47  Accordingly, only the legislature—and not the secretary of state—
was “vested with the power to create new deadlines for federal elections.”48  
The legislature had not passed a law either extending the deadline or 
authorizing the secretary to do so.  The secretary had therefore “exceeded his 
authority when he extended the deadline for submission of the qualifying 
papers.”49 
 
 41. No. 08-582-JJB, 2008 WL 11351516, at *2 (M.D. La. Sept. 25, 2008), stay granted, 
294 F. App’x 142 (5th Cir. 2008), preliminary injunction vacated as moot, 308 F. App’x 861 
(5th Cir. 2009). 
 42. Id.  State law established the initial deadline as September 2 but specified that if the 
central committee of a recognized state party failed to meet that deadline, the party’s national 
chair could file the required paperwork within the next 72 hours. Id. at *1 & n.4. 
 43. Id. at *2. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at *3. 
 49. Id. 
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The court went on to hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
barred the state from enforcing the original statutory deadline due to “[t]he 
hardships and the extreme circumstances faced by those seeking to file their 
party’s qualifying papers, in the midst of a natural disaster like Hurricane 
Gustav and the resulting power outages and impediments in many avenues 
of communication.”50  It therefore ordered the secretary to accept the 
Libertarian Party’s belated filing.51  The Fifth Circuit stayed this ruling, 
however, on the grounds that the record was “devoid of any evidence” that 
the Libertarian Party would have been able to file its completed paperwork 
on time “had Hurricane Gustav not occurred.”52  It also pointed out that, 
despite the closure of nonessential state offices due to the hurricane, “the 
election filing office of the Secretary of State of Louisiana remained open.”53  
The Fifth Circuit did not comment on the district court’s application of the 
independent state legislature doctrine.  The case was later dismissed as 
moot.54 
One unacknowledged consequence of the district court’s ruling, which 
purportedly enforced the legislature’s prerogatives, is that the legislature did 
not ultimately determine the new deadline.  Because the court concluded that 
it would have been unconstitutional to enforce the statutory deadline under 
the circumstances, the court imposed its own extended deadline, rather than 
allowing the secretary to decide how to address the emergency.55 
Another example arose following a ruling by the Sixth Circuit that Ohio’s 
ballot access requirements for third-party candidates were unconstitutional.56  
The Ohio General Assembly had subsequently failed to amend the 
invalidated statute, “leaving no lawful, statutory criteria to be followed by 
the Secretary of State or the various Boards of Election of each county.”57  
The Ohio secretary of state attempted to fill this gap by issuing a directive 
specifying the number of signatures required for third-party ballot access 
petitions, as well as the filing deadline for such petitions.58  The Libertarian 
Party failed to fulfill the directive’s requirements and challenged the resulting 
exclusion of its candidates from the ballot.59 
The court, as in Dardenne, began by noting that the Constitution grants the 
legislature the power to regulate federal elections.60  The secretary’s directive 
did not interpret or clarify any provisions of Ohio law, but rather 
 
 50. Id. at *4. 
 51. Id. at *5. 
 52. Libertarian Party v. Dardenne, 294 F. App’x 142, 145 (5th Cir. 2008), preliminary 
injunction vacated as moot, 308 F. App’x 861 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 53. Id. at 144. 
 54. Libertarian Party v. Dardenne, 308 F. App’x 861 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 55. Dardenne, 2008 WL 11351516, at *5. 
 56. Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Blackwell, 462 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 57. Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Brunner, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1009 (S.D. Ohio 2008). 
 58. Id. at 1010. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1011 (“Plaintiffs correctly contend that only the legislative branch has the 
authority, under Articles I and II of the United States Constitution, to prescribe the manner of 
electing candidates for federal office.”). 
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“establishe[d] a new structure for minor party ballot access, a structure not 
approved by the Ohio legislature.”61  The legislature, however, had not 
delegated authority to the secretary to adopt any such rules.62  The secretary 
pointed to a state law authorizing her to issue directives to boards of election 
and “[p]repare rules and instructions for the conduct of elections.”63  The 
court held that this power did not “extend to filling a void in Ohio’s election 
law caused by the legislature ignoring a judicial pronouncement declaring a 
state statute unconstitutional.”64  The secretary’s directive therefore violated 
the U.S. Constitution and was void.65  The court directed the secretary to 
include the Libertarian Party’s candidates on the ballot because the 
“‘available evidence’ establishe[d] that the party ha[d] ‘the requisite 
community support.’”66 
The Eighth Circuit invoked this aspect of the doctrine during the 2020 
presidential election in Carson v. Simon.67  In Carson, Minnesota law 
specified that absentee ballots were valid only if election officials received 
them by the close of polls on Election Day.68  Minnesota’s secretary of state 
entered into a consent decree in state court with a private group agreeing to 
refrain from enforcing this requirement due to the COVID-19 pandemic.69  
The consent decree further specified that ballots received within five business 
days of Election Day would be counted so long as they were either 
postmarked before Election Day or lacked a postmark.70 
Two Republican candidates for presidential elector from Minnesota sued 
in federal court, arguing that the secretary’s consent decree violated the 
Presidential Electors Clause.71  The Eighth Circuit held that their claim was 
likely to succeed.72  The court explained, “[O]nly the Minnesota Legislature, 
and not the Secretary, has plenary authority to establish the manner of 
conducting the presidential election in Minnesota . . . .  [I]t is not the province 
of a state executive official to re-write the state’s election code, at least as it 
pertains to selection of presidential electors.”73  Accordingly, the court 
entered a preliminary injunction ordering the secretary of state to segregate 
 
 61. Id. at 1012. 
 62. Id. (“[T]here is no evidence that the state legislature has specifically delegated its 
authority to [the secretary] to direct the manner in which the state of Ohio [conducts federal 
elections].”). 
 63. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.05(B)–(C) (West 2021)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1013.  The court also held, in the alternative, that the ballot access requirements 
the secretary adopted were unconstitutionally burdensome. Id. at 1013–14. 
 66. Id. at 1015 (quoting McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1317, 1323 (1976)). 
 67. 978 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). 
 68. Id. at 1055 (citing MINN. STAT. § 203B.08, subd. 3 (2020)). 
 69. See id. at 1055–56. 
 70. See id. at 1056.  The consent decree allowed election officials to reject unpostmarked 
ballots, however, if the preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that they were mailed 
after Election Day. Id.  There was no indication of what sort of evidence would be sufficient 
to meet that standard. See id. 
 71. Id. at 1054. 
 72. Id. at 1059. 
 73. Id. at 1060. 
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any absentee ballots received after the statutory deadline to allow them “to 
be removed from vote totals” in the event a court later issued a final order to 
that effect.74 
In Moore v. Circosta,75 another case arising from the 2020 election, the 
Supreme Court, by a 5–3 vote, declined without opinion to enjoin a similar 
consent decree executed by the North Carolina State Board of Elections to 
extend the deadline for absentee ballots;76 newly appointed Justice Barrett 
did not participate in the vote.77  Justice Gorsuch, dissenting from the Court’s 
refusal to enjoin the consent decree, suggested that it was “egregious” for “a 
state court and the Board [to] work[] together to override a carefully tailored 
legislative response to COVID.”78  He added, “[E]fforts like these . . . offend 
the Elections Clause’s textual commitment of responsibility for election 
lawmaking to state and federal legislators . . . .”79  Moreover, “[s]uch 
last-minute changes by largely unaccountable bodies . . . invite confusion, 
risk altering election outcomes, and in the process threaten voter confidence 
in the results.”80 
Cases like Brunner, Dardenne, and Carson are rare because most of the 
directives and policies that election officials promulgate are designed to 
implement some underlying statute.81  Election officials seldom act ultra 
vires or otherwise directly contrary to state law; those who do are typically 
responding to unusual circumstances, such as a natural disaster.82  Courts 
properly reject challenges under the doctrine when officials can point to 
statutory authorization for their actions.83 
 
 74. Id. at 1062–63. 
 75. 141 S. Ct. 46 (2020) (mem.) (declining to grant injunction pending appeal). 
 76. Id.  Justice Thomas voted to enjoin the consent decree without issuing an opinion. Id.  
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, issued a written dissent from the court’s ruling. Id. 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of injunctive relief pending appeal). 
 77. See 141 S. Ct. 46 (2020) (mem.). 
 78. Id. at 47 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of injunctive relief pending appeal). 
 79. Id. at 48. 
 80. Id. 
 81. For other examples of judges invoking the doctrine during the 2020 election, see Tex. 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 136, 150 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, J., 
concurring) (“Under the Constitution, it is the state legislature—not the governor or federal 
judges—that is authorized to establish the rules that govern the election of each state’s 
Presidential electors . . . .”); Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 104 (4th Cir. 2020) (Wilksinson, 
J., dissenting) (“The Constitution does not assign these powers holistically to the state 
governments but rather pinpoints a particular branch of state government—‘the Legislatures 
thereof.’  Whether it is a federal court . . . or a state election board—as it is here—does not 
matter; both are unaccountable entities stripping power from the legislatures.” (quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1)), injunction pending appeal denied, 141 S. Ct. 658 (2020) (mem.). 
 82. Several states have election emergency laws that authorize election officials to modify 
the rules of the electoral process as necessary to respond to such crises, thereby alleviating 
potential concerns under the independent state legislature doctrine. See Michael T. Morley, 
Election Emergencies:  Voting in the Wake of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks, 67 
EMORY L.J. 545, 610–13 (2018). 
 83. See, e.g., Green Party v. Hargett, 700 F.3d 816, 826 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting 
challenge under the independent state legislature doctrine because the state legislature 
“prescribed the key substantive regulations governing minor-party nominating petitions, 
including the 2.5% signature provision and 119-day filing deadline, while expressly delegating 
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This aspect of the independent state legislature doctrine may allow 
plaintiffs to circumvent the Pennhurst doctrine, which provides that state 
sovereign immunity generally precludes litigants from suing in federal court 
to compel state officials to comply with state law requirements.84  Typically, 
even when a litigant pursues a colorable federal claim in federal court against 
a state official, the Pennhurst doctrine bars them from simultaneously 
pursuing pendent state law claims against the official, as well.85  This prong 
of the independent state legislature doctrine may allow right-holders to couch 
at least some alleged state law violations in terms of the Elections Clause or 
Presidential Electors Clause, allowing them to circumvent the Pennhurst 
bar.86 
Since the constitutional question under this theory ultimately turns on the 
extent of an election official’s power under state law, one might argue that a 
state judge would be better equipped than a federal court to adjudicate the 
underlying issue.  A person’s views on this will likely turn, in part, on their 
attitude toward judicial parity more broadly.87  An unelected federal judge 
might be better situated to objectively assess the legal basis for a secretary of 
state’s decisions than an elected state judge—one who might later have to 
run in elections overseen by the secretary.  A federal judge also may be 
further removed from the state’s political scene and therefore better able to 
objectively adjudicate a case that is likely to have partisan consequences.88 
 
to the coordinator of elections the administrative task of establishing the petition’s form”); see 
also Iowa Voter All. v. Black Hawk County, No. C20-2078-LTS, 2020 WL 6151559, at *3 
(N.D. Iowa Oct. 20, 2020) (rejecting Elections Clause challenge to counties’ acceptance of 
private grants to subsidize additional resources for the 2020 election because no state law 
“forbids counties from accepting private grants to fund an election”); cf. Baldwin v. Cortes, 
378 F. App’x 135, 138–39 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting plaintiffs’ Presidential Electors Clause 
challenge to “the Secretary [of State’s] 1984 entry into the consent decrees” changing the 
deadline for candidates to file ballot access petitions, due to “the Pennsylvania legislature’s 
explicit delegation of authority to the Secretary of the Commonwealth to administer the state 
election scheme”). 
 84. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 124–25 (1984) 
(“[F]ederal courts lack[] jurisdiction to enjoin . . . state officials on the basis of . . . state law.”). 
 85. Id. at 121 (holding that the prohibition against federal court injunctions against state 
officials for violating state law “applies as well to state-law claims brought into federal court 
under pendent jurisdiction”); see also Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 
540–42 (2002) (holding that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 
does not alter Pennhurst’s proscription of federal court injunctions against state officials on 
the basis of pendent state law claims). 
 86. See, e.g., Democracy N.C. v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:20-CV-457, 2020 WL 
6589362, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 2, 2020) (“[T]his court intends to address whether the North 
Carolina State Board of Elections, by and through its most recent Memo 2020-19, has, through 
Executive action, unconstitutionally modified the North Carolina legislative scheme for 
appointing Presidential electors.  That is a constitutional question, not a question of state 
law.”), amended on reconsideration, 2020 WL 6591367 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 5, 2020) (amending 
briefing requirements). 
 87. See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) 
(arguing that state courts do not necessarily enforce constitutional rights as effectively as 
federal courts). 
 88. Professor Rick Pildes suggests that there may not be a single universally correct 
answer to questions such as this; the relative merits of federal and state courts as venues for 
adjudicating whether election officials have acted ultra vires may vary by state and even judge, 
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Even if litigants are able to challenge allegedly ultra vires actions under 
the Elections Clause or Presidential Electors Clause in federal court, the 
federal court may choose to allow the state judiciary to resolve the issue, 
instead, when the scope of an election official’s authority under state law is 
unclear.  A federal court may abstain under Railroad Commission of Texas 
v. Pullman Co.89 to avoid the possibility of unnecessarily adjudicating federal 
constitutional claims under the Elections Clause or Presidential Electors 
Clause.90  For example, invoking Pullman, a Pennsylvania federal district 
court abstained from addressing the Trump campaign’s claims under those 
provisions that the Pennsylvania secretary of state’s orders concerning 
absentee ballots and poll watchers were contrary to the plain text of state 
law.91  Thus, even if federal courts recognize this strand of the independent 
state legislature doctrine, many disputes over the scope of election officials’ 
power still may be initially channeled to state court. 
As discussed further in Part I.B, once the state judiciary interprets the state 
laws at issue, a federal court might claim the authority to assess whether the 
state courts exceeded permissible bounds of interpretation.92  That possibility 
implicates a different strand of the independent state legislature doctrine, 
however, and need not be accepted as a component of the ultra vires claims 
discussed here.  As suggested earlier,93 one other potential objection to this 
aspect of the doctrine is that it simply substitutes one surrogate 
decision-maker for another.  When a federal court determines that an election 
official’s policy violates the Elections Clause or Presidential Electors Clause 
because it is unauthorized by, or directly contrary to, state law, the court often 
must adopt an interim replacement policy to govern that aspect of the 
electoral process until the legislature steps in.94  Thus, the matter is still not 
governed by the legislature.  Moreover, the ostensibly expert determination 
of specialized election officials is displaced by the ruling of a generalist 
federal court that is further removed from the inner workings of the state’s 
election administration system. 
 
and may change over time. See Richard Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in 
Constitutional and Public Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7–9; cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity 
Reconsidered:  Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 256 (1988) 
(“[T]he issue of parity is an empirical question for which no empirical measure is possible.”). 
 89. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
 90. See, e.g., Miller v. Campbell, No. 3:10-cv-0252-RRB, 2010 WL 5071599, at *1–2 (D. 
Alaska Nov. 19, 2010) (declaring, in a case alleging that the “Division of Elections has, among 
other things, violated the Alaska Legislature’s prerogative by counting votes in a manner 
contrary to the legislative directive,” that “prudence, propriety, principles of judicial restraint, 
and a desire to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication lead this Court to abstain from 
resolving the current dispute and refer the parties to the appropriate State tribunal” (citing 
Pullman, 312 U.S. 496) (footnote omitted)). 
 91. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar, 481 F. Supp. 3d 476, 503 (W.D. Pa. 
2020), modification denied, No. 2:20-cv-966, 2020 WL 5407748 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2020). 
 92. See infra Section I.B. 
 93. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 94. See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Brunner, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1012 (S.D. Ohio 
2008). 
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In conclusion, a few courts have held that the Constitution’s grants of 
authority over federal elections specifically to the legislature make it 
unconstitutional for other state or local actors to purport to establish rules, 
procedures, or requirements for such elections absent statutory authorization 
or delegation, or otherwise contrary to state law.  This potential corollary of 
the independent state legislature doctrine does not alter election officials’ 
obligations or responsibilities, however, but instead simply opens up a 
federal forum for enforcing them.  Even then, federal courts may choose to 
abstain from adjudicating the underlying state law issues.  And they are likely 
to construe the doctrine narrowly in this context, to prevent transmuting 
every dispute over the meaning of a state election law or validity of an 
administrative issuance relating to federal elections into a federal 
constitutional issue.95 
B.  Interpreting State Laws Governing Federal Elections 
A more significant question is whether the independent state legislature 
doctrine impacts how courts must interpret state laws governing federal 
elections.  One of the doctrine’s potential implications is that courts must 
construe state election laws that apply to presidential and congressional 
elections consistently with their plain text, avoiding unexpected 
interpretations that appear contrary to that text.  Under this view, since the 
Constitution confers authority over federal elections specifically on the state 
legislature, courts must take special care to ensure that such elections are 
conducted according to the rules that the legislature establishes.  Those rules 
are set forth in the statutes that the legislature enacts.  Depending on how this 
approach is applied, courts may have to avoid considering the sorts of 
extrinsic factors, like the state constitution or substantive canons of 
construction, that may ordinarily guide their interpretation of state statutes. 
The Supreme Court’s unanimous per curiam opinion in Bush v. Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Board, which arose from the 2000 presidential 
election, appears to recognize this aspect of the doctrine as a constraint on 
statutory interpretation.96  The Florida Supreme Court had held that the 
Florida secretary of state could reject the results of manual ballot recounts 
that counties submitted after the statutory deadline only under certain narrow 
 
 95. See, e.g., West v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, No. 20-C-1348, 2020 WL 5253844, at *1–
2 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 3, 2020) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction over a challenge under the 
Presidential Electors Clause to election officials’ refusal to accept Kanye West’s candidacy 
papers for president, where his submission was logged as received at 5:00.14 because the 
doors to the Commission’s building had been locked, and state law required the papers to be 
filed “not later than 5 p.m.”). 
 96. See 531 U.S. 70, 75–78 (2000) (per curiam); see also Michael W. McConnell, 
Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 666 (2001) (arguing that 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board “was a powerful warning to the state court that the 
U.S. Supreme Court . . . was prepared to intervene if it appeared that the state court were 
twisting or distorting state law”). 
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circumstances.97  The court’s reasoning “relied in part upon the right to vote 
set forth in the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution.”98 
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed and remanded.99  It began 
by acknowledging that, “[a]s a general rule, this Court defers to a state court’s 
interpretation of a state statute.”100  The Court emphasized, however, that 
when a legislature passes laws regulating presidential elections, it acts 
pursuant to “a direct grant of authority made under [the Presidential Electors 
Clause].”101  Quoting McPherson v. Blacker,102 the Court explained that the 
Presidential Electors Clause’s “insertion” of an express reference to the 
legislature “operat[es] as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt 
to circumscribe the legislative power.”103  In other words, a state may not 
limit its legislature’s authority under the U.S. Constitution to regulate federal 
elections. 
The Court went on to express “considerable uncertainty as to the precise 
grounds for the [Florida Supreme Court’s] decision.”104  It said it was 
concerned that the “Florida Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as 
circumscribing the legislature’s authority under [the Presidential Electors 
Clause].”105  The Court pointed out that the lower court’s opinion alluded to 
various state constitutional provisions concerning voting rights.106  The 
Florida Supreme Court’s consideration of the state constitution apparently 
called into question the validity of its statutory interpretation.  Consequently, 
the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and remanded 
the case for further proceedings.107 
The Court’s unanimous ruling in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board 
is an important precedent for this strand of the independent state legislature 
doctrine in several respects.  First, rather than simply accepting the Florida 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law at face value, the Court looked 
behind the lower court’s ruling to assess its reasoning.  The Court 
acknowledged that, although it would generally accept a state court’s 
 
 97. See Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 74–75. 
 98. Id. at 75. 
 99. Id. at 78. 
 100. Id. at 76. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 103. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76 (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 
25). 
 104. Id. at 78 (quoting Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555 (1940)). 
 105. Id.; see also id. at 77 (noting that the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion contained 
“expressions . . . that may be read to indicate that it construed the Florida Election Code 
without regard to the extent to which the Florida Constitution could, consistent with [the 
Presidential Electors Clause], ‘circumscribe the legislative power’” (quoting McPherson, 146 
U.S. at 25)). 
 106. See id. at 77. 
 107. See id. at 78.  On remand, the Florida Supreme Court issued essentially the same 
opinion, but omitted any references to the state constitution.  See generally Palm Beach Cnty. 
Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Political 
Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 644 (2001) (“[T]he Florida Supreme Court came to 
precisely the same ruling as it had initially, but was duly chastened from ever mentioning its 
own state constitution.” (footnote omitted)). 
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interpretation of state law as dispositive, state laws enacted under the 
Presidential Electors Clause warranted a different approach.108  Additionally, 
the primary reason for the remand was to give the Florida Supreme Court the 
opportunity to clarify whether the state constitution was influencing its 
interpretation of the election code.109  The reasonable inference is that, when 
construing laws enacted under the Presidential Electors Clause, a court must 
focus specifically on the text, rather than on extrinsic considerations like the 
state constitution.110 
A total of four Justices joined in opinions providing further support for this 
theory in Bush v. Gore.111  Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist’s 
three-Justice concurrence is most closely associated with it.112  The 
concurrence declared that, because the Presidential Electors Clause delegates 
authority specifically to the legislature, “the text of the election law itself, 
and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on independent 
significance.”113  It further noted that “[a] significant departure from the 
legislative scheme for appointing Presidential electors presents a federal 
constitutional question.”114  To determine whether a state court has made 
such an unconstitutional departure, the U.S. Supreme Court “necessarily 
must examine the law of the State as it existed prior to the action of the [state] 
court.”115  The Supreme Court must “undertake an independent, if still 
deferential, analysis of state law.”116 
 
 108. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76. 
 109. Id. at 78. 
 110. See Saul Zipkin, Note, Judicial Redistricting and the Article I State Legislature, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 350, 364–65 (2003) (“The implication was that if the Florida court had relied 
on state constitutional law, the decision would be struck down on the Article II basis.”); see 
also McConnell, supra note 96, at 666. 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board also appears to reaffirm a separate potential aspect 
of the independent state legislature doctrine:  the notion that a state constitution may not 
impose substantive constraints on the scope of a legislature’s authority to regulate federal 
elections. See David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore:  What Were They Thinking, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
737, 748 (2001) (explaining that Palm Beach County Canvassing Board “was generally 
viewed as resolving—not just raising—the question whether [the Presidential Electors Clause] 
precludes state constitutional limits on legislative action”).  That is a separate issue from 
whether the doctrine impacts the proper interpretation of state laws governing federal 
elections, however, and will be discussed in a subsequent section. See infra Part II.A. 
 111. 531 U.S. 98, 111–22 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 129–35 (Souter, J., 
dissenting); see also Harold J. Krent, Judging Judging:  The Problem of Second-Guessing 
State Judges’ Interpretation of State Law in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 493, 502 
(2002) (“Both the concurring and dissenting opinions accept[] the premise that [the 
Presidential Electors Clause] prohibits state courts from changing the manner in which 
presidential electors are selected.”). 
 112. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 113. Id. at 113. 
 114. Id.  The concurrence later elaborated that “with respect to a Presidential election, the 
court must be both mindful of the legislature’s role under Article II in choosing the manner of 
appointing electors and deferential to those bodies expressly empowered by the legislature to 
carry out its constitutional mandate.” Id. at 114. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.; see also id. at 115 (reiterating that, due to “the explicit requirements of Article II,” 
the Court must assess whether a state court “has actually departed from the statutory meaning” 
of state laws governing presidential elections). 
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Justice David Souter’s dissent also appears to accept the premise that the 
Presidential Electors Clause empowers the U.S. Supreme Court to review a 
state court’s interpretation of a state statute governing presidential elections, 
albeit with great deference.  In his view, “the issue is whether the judgment 
of the State Supreme Court has displaced the state legislature’s 
provisions.”117  A federal court must determine whether “the law as declared 
by the [state] court [is] different from the provisions made by the legislature, 
to which the National Constitution commits responsibility for determining 
how each State’s Presidential electors are chosen[.]”118  Souter concludes 
that the Florida Supreme Court’s rulings were “within the bounds of 
reasonable interpretation, and the law as declared is consistent with Article 
II.”119  His opinion accordingly implies that, had the state court’s ruling gone 
beyond the bounds of reasonable interpretation, it would have violated the 
legislature’s prerogatives under Article II.120 
Despite its lengthy array of critics,121 several commentators have endorsed 
this interpretation of Article II, including Professors Michael L. Wells,122 
 
 117. Id. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 131. 
 120. The other dissents, in contrast, flatly rejected this aspect of the independent state 
legislature doctrine. See id. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (declaring that Article II does not 
“grant[] federal judges any special authority to substitute their views for those of the state 
judiciary on matters of state law”); id. at 142 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Article II does not 
call for the scrutiny undertaken by this Court . . . .  Federal courts defer to a state high court’s 
interpretations of the State’s own law.”); id. at 147–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree 
that THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s unusual review of state law in this case is justified by reference . . . 
to Art. II . . . .” (internal citation omitted)).  Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, who joined in 
the majority opinion but not Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, did not discuss the issue. 
Cf. Ann Althouse, The Authoritative Lawsaying Power of the State Supreme Court and the 
United States Supreme Court:  Conflicts of Judicial Orthodoxy in the Bush-Gore Litigation, 
61 MD. L. REV. 508, 513 (2002) (“Justices Souter and Breyer did not disagree with the 
proposition that it is possible for the state court to distort statutory interpretation to the point 
where it should be seen as displacing the state legislature.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub 
and its Disguises:  Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 
191–92 (2001) (“Plainly then, Justices Ginsburg and Souter . . . and Justice Breyer . . . would 
have to concede that a proper function for the Supreme Court is to police a state’s highest 
court’s interpretation of state law, whether judge- or legislature-made, to ensure compliance 
with governing federal constitutional norms, unless the political question doctrine renders the 
case nonjusticiable.”). 
 121. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 
89 CALIF. L. REV. 1721, 1736 (2001) (calling this interpretation of the Presidential Electors 
Clause “almost laughable”); Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections:  The 
Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 626 (2002); Jonathan F. Mitchell, 
Reconsidering Murdock:  State-Law Reversals as Constitutional Avoidance, 77 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1335, 1377 (2010); Richard Pildes, Judging “New Law” in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 691, 726–27 (2002); Schapiro, supra note 7, at 662; Robert A. Schapiro, Article 
II as Interpretive Theory:  Bush v. Gore and the Retreat from Erie, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 89, 
97 (2002) (“[N]either the language of Article II, nor the limited cases prior to Bush v. Gore 
interpreting Article II, supports the concurrence.”). 
 122. See Michael L. Wells, Were There Adequate State Grounds in Bush v. Gore?, 18 
CONST. COMMENT. 403, 405 (2001) (“The existence of a federal constraint on state court 
authority, such as article II, is sufficient to justify [federal judicial] intervention.”); see also 
Michael L. Wells & Jeffry M. Netter, Article II and the Florida Election Case:  A Public 
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Michael McConnell,123 Richard D. Friedman,124 and several others,125 as 
well as Judge Richard Posner.126  Even Professor Laurence Tribe, who served 
on Vice President Al Gore’s legal team before the U.S. Supreme Court and 
is generally a harsh critic of Bush v. Gore,127 acknowledged that “Article II’s 
explicit delegation of authority” to state legislatures “seemingly authorize[s]” 
a federal court to “disagree[]” with a state supreme court’s interpretation of 
state law.128  He declared that it is “entirely proper” for federal courts to 
engage in “some degree of second-guessing” of state courts’ interpretations 
of state laws regulating presidential elections.129  Federal courts, he 
explained, have “the institutional function of checking the state court’s 
 
Choice Perspective, 61 MD. L. REV. 711, 725 (2002) (“[T]he rules-of-the-game norm 
demonstrates that Article II imposes on state courts an obligation to give considerable weight 
to the rules embodied in statutory texts and prior cases.”). 
 123. See McConnell, supra note 96, at 661 (arguing that the Presidential Electors Clause 
“departs from the usual principle of federal constitutional law, which allows the people of 
each state to determine for themselves how to allocate power among their state governing 
institutions,” and “puts the federal court in the awkward and unusual posture of having to 
determine for itself whether a state court’s ‘interpretation’ of state law is an authentic reading 
of the legislative will”). 
 124. See Richard D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 811, 839–40 (2001) (arguing that the rules for a presidential election “should not be 
changed during the determination process in such a way that leads to declaration of another 
slate as the winners . . . and this prohibition should apply whether the change in law is effected 
by the legislature or by the courts”). 
 125. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 111, at 511 (“[C]oncerns for predictability and 
accountability support the Supreme Court’s decision to review state court interpretation of 
state law in the presidential elector setting.”); Peter Berkowitz & Benjamin Wittes, The 
Lawfulness of the Election Decision:  A Reply to Professor Tribe, 49 VILL. L. REV. 429, 463–
80, 483 (2004) (defending the application of this aspect of the independent state legislature 
doctrine in the Bush v. Gore concurrence); Richard A. Epstein, “In Such Manner as the 
Legislature Thereof May Direct”:  The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 
613, 620 (2001) (arguing that if “the state courts or state executive officials have failed 
properly to apply the state scheme, resulting in a gross deviation from the legislature’s 
directives, then a federal court can review the matter under Article II”); see also Althouse, 
supra note 120, at 574 (stating, in reference to Bush v. Gore, that “there must be some limit to 
the extremes to which a state court can go in calling things state law”); Michael E. Solimine, 
Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 
344, 347 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s review of “purportedly state-law based 
decisions” in cases arising from the 2000 election “was unremarkable, given precedent,” 
because the Court may review a state-law ruling “that itself was alleged to violate the Federal 
Constitution”). 
Professor Henry Paul Monaghan argues that, if the Presidential Electors Clause in fact limits 
a state court’s interpretive authority over state election law, then Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
concurrence should have gone even further by reviewing the Florida Supreme Court’s 
interpretation de novo. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court 
Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1934 (2003). 
 126. RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK:  THE 2000 ELECTION, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 153–56 (2001). 
 127. See Tribe, supra note 120, at 185. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 192; see also id. at 185–86 (cautioning against “reading [the Presidential 
Electors Clause] out of the Constitution” and declaring that federal courts may review state 
courts’ interpretations of state election laws “in appropriate circumstances”). 
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construction of state election legislation to ensure that federal constitutional 
ground rules (here, those of Article II) are followed.”130 
One of the main objections to this potential implication of the independent 
state legislature doctrine is that it is inconsistent with the Erie doctrine,131 
which generally requires federal courts to abide by state courts’ 
interpretations of state laws.132  Critics argue that federalism-related 
principles bar federal courts from second-guessing a state supreme court’s 
contemporaneous interpretation of state law.  State judges are not only better 
positioned than federal judges to construe state election codes133 but also 
have the authority to issue dispositive rulings about their meaning.134 
Notwithstanding the Erie doctrine, however, there are several contexts in 
which the Supreme Court will independently review or adjudicate a state law 
issue for itself, at least to some extent.135 
First, the Supreme Court will review a state supreme court’s interpretation 
of state law under the Due Process Clause to determine whether a statute’s 
language, read in light of precedent, was enough to give a criminal defendant 
fair notice of what the law meant.  When a state court’s interpretation 
unexpectedly and materially deviates from statutory language and precedent, 
the Due Process Clause prohibits the state from retroactively applying that 
new interpretation to the defendant in the case pending before it.  In Bouie v. 
City of Columbia,136 for example, South Carolina’s trespass law prohibited 
“entry upon the lands of another” after the owner or tenant had given a notice 
 
 130. Id. at 193; see also id. at 188 (“Plainly, the federal judiciary . . . must ensure 
compliance with Article II and every other provision of the federal Constitution that in some 
way constrains the process for choosing presidential electors.”). 
 131. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 132. See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 121, at 91 (“[T]he interpretive approach of the 
concurrence hearkens back to the Supreme Court’s attitude toward state law in the period 
before Erie Railroad v. Tompkins overruled Swift.” (footnote omitted)); Louis Michael 
Seidman, What’s So Bad About Bush v. Gore?:  An Essay on Our Unsettled Election, 47 
WAYNE L. REV. 953, 992–93 (2001); cf. Issacharoff, supra note 107, at 642 (asserting, in 
discussing Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, that “[p]erhaps not since Erie v. Tompkins 
overruled Swift v. Tyson has a decision turned so heavily on the question of the source of state 
law” (footnotes omitted)). 
 133. See Schapiro, supra note 7, at 682; cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039–40 
(1983) (“The process of examining state law is unsatisfactory because it requires us to interpret 
state laws with which we are generally unfamiliar . . . .”); Klarman, supra note 121, at 1735 
(discussing the lack of “any functional justification for affording state legislatures federal 
judicial protection from their own state judiciaries”). 
 134. See Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177 (1940); see also Althouse, supra 
note 120, at 517 (“The Florida Supreme Court can infuse the statutory text with values about 
the sanctity of the vote . . . and, because of its final interpretive authority, that is what state 
law is.”). 
 135. See Monaghan, supra note 125, at 1968 (describing lines of precedent in which the 
Court has exercised its independent judgment when evaluating state law issues in federal 
cases); Krent, supra note 111, at 495 (same); see also Mitchell, supra note 121, at 1338 
(discussing “the Supreme Court’s already-established prerogative to reject state supreme court 
interpretations of state law in cases where the justices wish to enforce federal rights against 
the states”). 
 136. 378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
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“prohibiting such entry.”137  African American civil rights protestors were 
convicted for violating the law by holding a sit-in at a racially segregated 
lunch counter.138  The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed their 
convictions, ruling that the statute prohibited people from remaining on 
another’s property after being asked to leave.139 
In reversing the defendants’ convictions, the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
contend that the South Carolina Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law 
was erroneous.  Rather, the Court held that the state court’s interpretation 
was such an “unforeseeable judicial enlargement” of the statute’s text that 
the Due Process Clause barred the state from applying that understanding 
retroactively to the protestors.140  The statutory text did not “give fair 
warning of the conduct that it makes a crime.”141 
Some commentators, echoing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,142 have 
objected to the use of precedents such as Bouie on the grounds that they were 
responses to pervasive racial discrimination during the civil rights era by 
southern court systems that twisted state laws to subordinate African 
Americans.143  But these due process, fair notice protections go beyond civil 
rights era precedent.144 
Second, when a state court holds that a federal claim has been waived, has 
been forfeited, or is otherwise procedurally barred or defaulted on state law 
grounds, the Supreme Court will review the “adequacy” of those grounds,145 
 
 137. Id. at 349–50 (emphasis added). 
 138. Id. at 348–49. 
 139. Id. at 350. 
 140. Id. at 353. 
 141. Id. at 350. 
 142. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 140–44 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 143. See Larry Catá Backer, Race, the Race, and the Republic:  Re-conceiving Judicial 
Authority After Bush v. Gore, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1057, 1101–03, 1103 n.158 (2002) (arguing 
that Bouie and Patterson “are limited to their historical and racialized context out of which 
broader application is inappropriate”); Seidman, supra note 132, at 1006–09; see also Pildes, 
supra note 88, at 11; Schapiro, supra note 121, at 101. 
 144. See, e.g., Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432 (1973) (holding that the Due Process 
Clause barred the state from revoking the petitioner’s probation for failing to report a traffic 
citation, since he had been required to report any “arrest” and “no prior Missouri decisional 
law . . . support[s] the contention that a traffic citation has ever before been treated as the 
equivalent of an arrest”); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 315 (1972) (per curiam) 
(reversing obscenity conviction because, due to the state supreme court’s interpretation of the 
statute, the defendant’s conviction was “affirmed under a statute with a meaning quite 
different from the one he was charged with violating”).  But see Krent, supra note 111, at 521 
(“Bouie is best understood as a means of limiting judicial vindictiveness rather than protecting 
offenders’ reliance interests or ensuring repose.”). 
 145. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 366 (1990) (“The adequacy of the state-law ground to 
support a judgment precluding litigation of the federal claim is itself a federal question which 
we review de novo.”); see also Mitchell, supra note 121, at 1356 (“It is now well settled that 
the Supreme Court may review and set aside a state supreme court’s interpretation of state law 
that lacks ‘fair and substantial’ or ‘adequate’ support when state courts use their interpretive 
powers over state law to thwart litigants’ efforts to vindicate their federal rights.”); see, e.g., 
E. Brantley Webb, Note, How to Review State Court Determinations of State Law Antecedent 
to Federal Rights, 120 YALE L.J. 1192, 1213–16 (2011) (collecting cases). 
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both on direct appeal and in the context of a collateral challenge.146  The 
Court will not allow a state court’s spurious or dubious interpretation of a 
state law procedural requirement to preclude review of an underlying federal 
question.  In determining the “adequacy” of state law grounds, the Court will 
consider several factors, including whether the procedural barrier is novel, 
state courts have consistently applied the barrier, and the barrier furthers 
valid state interests.147  This doctrine does not necessarily require a federal 
court to assess whether the state court’s interpretation or application of a state 
law procedural doctrine was correct.  Rather, a federal court will determine 
whether the state court’s ruling was generally consistent with state law and 
practice prior to that point.148 
In James v. Kentucky,149 for example, a criminal defendant asked a state 
trial judge to issue an “admonition” to the jury that the defendant’s refusal to 
testify should not be held against him; the judge refused.150  On appeal, the 
state supreme court held that the defendant had waived his underlying Fifth 
Amendment claim by requesting an “admonition” rather than an 
“instruction.”151  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
defendant’s failure to couch his request in precisely the right language was 
not a valid basis for refusing to consider his federal constitutional claim.152  
The Court explained that the procedural rule that the state supreme court had 
invoked was “not the sort of firmly established and regularly followed state 
practice that can prevent implementation of federal constitutional rights.”153  
The state supreme court’s insistence that defendants use the term 
“instruction” rather than “admonition,” the Court continued, was an “arid 
ritual of meaningless form” that “further[ed] no perceivable state interest.”154 
 
 146. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991) (“We have applied the 
independent and adequate state ground doctrine not only in our own review of state court 
judgments, but in deciding whether federal district courts should address the claims of state 
prisoners in habeas corpus actions.”). 
 147. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1991) (“[O]nly a ‘firmly established and 
regularly followed state practice’ may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review 
by this Court of a federal constitutional claim.” (quoting James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 
348 (1984))); see, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1969) 
(holding that the Virginia Supreme Court’s precedents “do not enable us to say that the 
Virginia court has so consistently applied its notice requirement as to” render it an adequate 
basis for precluding adjudication of a federal claim); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 
149 (1964) (rejecting the state supreme court’s ruling that a general objection was insufficient 
to preserve the defendant’s federal claim because that court had recently adjudicated several 
issues that had been preserved through general objections). 
 148. See Radha A. Pathak, Incorporated State Law, 61 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 823, 838 
(2011). 
 149. 466 U.S. 341 (1984). 
 150. Id. at 348–49. 
 151. Id. at 344. 
 152. Id. at 351–52. 
 153. Id. at 348–49. 
 154. Id. at 349 (internal citations omitted); see also Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 
(1923) (“Whatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights 
that the State confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not 
to be defeated under the name of local practice.”). 
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Third, in a wide variety of contexts, the Court will assess substantive state 
law issues that are antecedent to federal questions, such as claims under the 
U.S. Constitution or federal treaties.155  For example, the Contracts Clause 
prohibits states from “impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”156  In cases 
arising under the Contracts Clause, the Court is not bound by a state court’s 
determinations as to the existence or contents of an alleged contract.157  
Rather, the Court will decide for itself “whether a contract was made, what 
are its terms and conditions, and whether the State has, by later legislation, 
impaired its obligation.”158 
The extent to which the Court would defer to a state court’s antecedent 
rulings in this context has varied over time.  In the mid-nineteenth century, 
the Court reviewed such issues de novo, “routinely second-guess[ing] state 
court findings” about whether the parties had formed a contract.159  By the 
end of that century, however, its review had become more deferential.160  
Some precedents declare that the Court will uphold a state court’s resolution 
of contract-related issues unless it is “manifestly wrong”161 or “palpably 
erroneous.”162  Currently, the Court will simply “accord respectful 
consideration and great weight to the views of the State’s highest court.”163 
 
 155. See Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:  Reflections 
on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1052 (1977) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s “ancillary jurisdiction to consider the state question” when a 
federal issue “turns on a logically antecedent finding on a matter of state law”).  One 
commentator suggests that, when the Court claims to be determining whether a state court had 
“fair support” for its antecedent state law conclusions in such cases, it is instead considering 
whether the state court attempted to evade federal rights.  Webb, supra note 145, at 1206, 
1208.  Professor Monaghan offers a different interpretation, stating that the existence of 
“property” or a “contract” for purposes of a federal constitutional claim is really a federal issue 
that the Supreme Court may assess independently of state law. See Monaghan, supra note 125, 
at 1941–42. 
 156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 157. See Michael G. Collins, Reconstructing Murdock v. Memphis, 98 VA. L. REV. 1439, 
1455–56 (2012). 
 158. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938); see also Gen. Motors 
Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992). 
 159. Collins, supra note 157, at 1456.  For examples of cases that reflect this tendency, see 
Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436, 443 (1862) (holding that the Court 
may “decide, independently of all adjudication by the Supreme Court of a State, whether or 
not the phraseology of the instrument in controversy was expressive of a contract and within 
the protection of the Constitution of the United States”); Piqua Branch of State Bank of Ohio 
v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369, 392 (1854) (declaring that the Court is “called upon to 
exercise our own judgments in the case” as to whether a contract exists for purposes of the 
Contracts Clause). 
 160. See Collins, supra note 157, at 1457 n.73.  For examples of cases that demonstrate the 
Court’s more deferential approach in this period, see Given v. Wright, 117 U.S. 648, 655–57 
(1886) (assessing whether the state court’s ruling that the landowners had “surrendered” their 
contractual exemption from taxation was “well grounded”); University v. People, 99 U.S. 309, 
322–23 (1879) (according “deference” to the state court’s rulings on state-law issues in 
Contracts Clause cases). 
 161. Hale v. State Bd. of Assessment & Rev., 302 U.S. 95, 101 (1937). 
 162. Phelps v. Bd. of Educ., 300 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). 
 163. Brand, 303 U.S. at 100; accord Romein, 503 U.S. at 187. 
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Likewise, on direct review in Takings Clause cases, the Court may assess 
for itself whether the plaintiff’s claimed property interest was valid.164  In 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection,165 the plurality declined to accord any deference to the state 
court’s determination of whether the plaintiff was challenging the 
deprivation of an “established property right.”166  Florida law had granted 
the owners of beachfront land certain property interests extending to the 
mean high-water line, including the rights to access the water, have an 
unobstructed view of the water, and retain any accretions and relictions.167  
A statute provided that, when a locality carried out a project to remediate 
erosion by depositing new sand onto a beach, the rights of landowners within 
the remediation zone were pushed back from the mean high-water line to the 
“erosion control line.”168  Affected landowners would lose their right to 
accretions and relictions between that new erosion control line and the former 
mean high-water line.169 
A group of landowners who owned beachfront property within a 
remediation zone sued, arguing that this law authorized unconstitutional 
takings of their property interests.170  The Florida Supreme Court rejected 
the landowners’ claim on the grounds that they held only a contingent future 
interest in accretions and relictions rather than a vested right subject to 
constitutional protection.171  The landowners appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, arguing that the state court’s ruling was itself a “judicial taking” in 
violation of the U.S. Constitution.172  According to the landowners, the 
Florida Supreme Court’s ruling reduced the nature of their interest in 
accretions and relictions to a mere unvested contingency.173  The Court 
concluded that it had to review Florida law de novo to determine whether the 
Florida Supreme Court had unconstitutionally eliminated the plaintiffs’ 
property interests.174  “The plurality’s standard of review accords no 
deference to state court interpretations of antecedent state property law; 
instead, it conducts an independent assessment of state law.”175 
The Court has applied similarly aggressive review where a state law issue 
is antecedent to enforcing rights under a treaty.  Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s 
 
 164. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 
726 n.9 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 165. 560 U.S. 702, 725 (2010). 
 166. Id. at 726 n.9.  The Court went on to note, however, that “[a] property right is not 
established if there is doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not make our 
own assessment but accept the determination of the state court.” Id. 
 167. Id. at 708.  “Accretions are additions of alluvion (sand, sediment, or other deposits) to 
waterfront land; relictions are lands once covered by water that become dry when the water 
recedes.” Id. 
 168. Id. at 711–12. 
 169. Id. at 709–11. 
 170. Id. at 711–12. 
 171. Id. at 712. 
 172. See id. at 711–12. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id. at 726 n.9. 
 175. Webb, supra note 145, at 1231. 
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Lessee,176 for example, was a suit over whether the Commonwealth of 
Virginia had violated treaties between the United States and Great Britain by 
seizing certain land in Virginia’s Northern Neck that a previous owner, the 
late Lord Fairfax, had devised to a British subject, Denny Fairfax.177  The 
Court held that it need not determine whether the seizure violated a treaty, 
however, because the Virginia Court of Appeals had erred in concluding that 
the Commonwealth had validly taken title to the land under state law.178  In 
another early case alleging treaty violations, the Court similarly claimed the 
power to ascertain the “true construction” of state law to determine whether 
the plaintiff had still owned certain land at the time the peace treaty with 
Great Britain went into effect.179  In these early cases, the Court appeared to 
review de novo the state law issues that were antecedent to the plaintiffs’ 
claims under treaties.180 
The U.S. Supreme Court has gone so far as to review a state supreme 
court’s interpretation of its own state constitution in cases involving interstate 
compacts.  In West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims,181 West Virginia had joined 
an interstate compact establishing an interstate commission to control 
pollution in the Ohio River.182  West Virginia’s auditor later refused to pay 
the state’s share of the commission’s expenses.183  In a mandamus action 
brought against the auditor, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that the 
compact was unenforceable because the West Virginia legislature had lacked 
authority to approve it under the state constitution.184  The U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed.185  Construing the West Virginia Constitution for itself,186 
the Court concluded that the legislature had authority to enter into the 
compact, despite the state supreme court’s ruling to the contrary.187 
 
 176. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813). 
 177. Id. at 606–13. 
 178. Id. at 626–27 (holding that, because the Commonwealth’s title to the land was 
“inchoate and imperfect,” it was “wholly unnecessary” to consider whether the 
Commonwealth’s purported seizure of the land violated the peace treaty between the United 
States and Great Britain); see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 357–
58 (1816) (reiterating that the Court could not “decide whether a title [to land] be within the 
protection of a treaty, until it is ascertained what that title is, and whether it have a legal 
validity”). 
 179. Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 286, 305 (1810) (holding that it was 
“necessary . . . to inquire whether the confiscation, declared by the state laws, was final and 
complete, at the time the treaty was made,” to determine whether the state had violated the 
plaintiff’s rights under the treaty). 
 180. See Collins, supra note 157, at 1455. 
 181. 341 U.S. 22 (1951). 
 182. Id. at 24. 
 183. Id. at 25. 
 184. Id. at 26. 
 185. Id. at 32. 
 186. Id. at 28 (“[W]e are free to examine determinations of law by State courts in the limited 
field where a compact brings in issue the rights of other States and the United States.”). 
 187. Id. at 32 (“[W]e conclude that the obligation of the State under the Compact is not in 
conflict with . . . the State Constitution.”); cf. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 
175, 206–07 (1864) (rejecting a state supreme court’s interpretation of its state’s constitution, 
before the adoption of the Erie doctrine). 
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Opponents also assert that applying the independent state legislature 
doctrine to state statutory interpretation issues would unnecessarily 
federalize virtually every aspect of federal elections.188  When states grant 
their courts jurisdiction over election-related disputes, they necessarily 
authorize those courts—not federal courts—to act as the primary expositors 
of state law,189 according to whatever tools of statutory interpretation those 
courts typically apply.190  State courts have the same authority over state 
election law as they have in other contexts, including the “power to make a 
novel post-election construction of forum election law.”191 
Conversely, “[c]onstitutional grants of power to legislatures do not 
ordinarily give rise to special constitutional rules of statutory 
interpretation.”192  The Presidential Electors Clause takes the legislatures as 
it finds them:  “as institutions embedded in a whole state government, a 
system that would necessarily include a constitution and a judicial 
system.”193  Moreover, as a practical matter, applying the independent state 
legislature doctrine in this respect may require courts to interpret laws 
governing federal elections using a different methodology than those courts 
apply to the rest of the election code, potentially leading to inconsistent and 
unpredictable results.194 
On the other hand, allowing federal courts to enforce broad outer 
boundaries on how state courts interpret state election laws may contribute 
 
 188. See Issacharoff, supra note 107, at 646–47 (“[F]ederal constitutional review of 
changed state election procedures would in turn require that every local and state election 
procedure be subject to federal judicial scrutiny.”); see also Schapiro, supra note 121, at 116 
(“The Article II theory federalizes any state-law challenge to such [election] procedures.”); cf. 
Friedman, supra note 124, at 841 (“Article II should not become a tool to federalize state law 
concerning disputes in determining the results of the state’s election for presidential electors 
by depriving state courts of the usual leeway to decide difficult cases.”); Pildes, supra note 
121, at 719 (emphasizing the need to “avoid turning every disputed state election law ruling 
into a federal constitutional question”). 
 189. See Seidman, supra note 132, at 995–96 (“Since the legislature clearly contemplated 
a state judicial role in the contest procedures and was silent concerning an analogous federal 
role, it seems plausible to assume that it meant for state, rather than federal judges to have the 
final word on disputed issues of state law.” (footnote omitted)); see also Klarman, supra note 
121, at 1735–36. 
 190. See Schapiro, supra note 121, at 98 (arguing that the Presidential Electors Clause 
“could constitute a reference to state law, as that law commonly is made, involving the usual 
interplay of state statutes, the state constitution, and judicial interpretations”); Seidman, supra 
note 132, at 995 (“What counts as ‘ordinary’ construction is, itself, a matter for state law.”).  
Professor Michael Klarman also points to the lack of evidence “that the Framers of Article II 
intended to bolster the role of state legislatures in the selection of presidential electors by 
constraining state courts adjudicating contests arising out of presidential elections in their 
ability to resolve ambiguities in the meaning of state election law.”  Klarman, supra note 121, 
at 1735. 
 191. Weinberg, supra note 121, at 626. 
 192. Wells & Netter, supra note 122, at 714; see also Weinberg, supra note 121, at 625 
(“Nothing in the Constitution requires a state election code or its administration to be 
unmediated in these usual ways by courts.”). 
 193. Althouse, supra note 120, at 519; see also Schapiro, supra note 7, at 663 (“Without 
an understanding of a particular state’s system, it is impossible to comprehend the appropriate 
relationship between state courts and state legislatures.”). 
 194. See Schapiro, supra note 121, at 115. 
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to election integrity.195  Requiring judges to follow the plain meaning of 
election laws and avoid major departures from text and precedent prevents 
them from changing the rules of an election after the Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance has been lifted and the beneficiaries of different potential 
approaches are known.196  In contrast, allowing state judges to make 
substantial, unexpected deviations from the apparent meaning of state 
election laws creates the inevitable “danger that a rule will be adopted 
because it will produce a particular result, and then rationalized on other 
grounds.”197  Providing an additional check on state judges—many of whom 
are themselves elected—can deter such departures from preexisting rules, 
especially in high-stakes contexts such as a hotly contested presidential 
election.  As Professor Rick Pildes explains, “mak[ing] state law completely 
autonomous would give too little weight . . . to a legitimate constitutional 
interest in ensuring the integrity of electoral processes.”198 
Applying the independent state legislature doctrine in this manner may 
also bolster predictability, consistency, and stability, which are essential 
principles for an election.199  Unpredictable changes in state election law—
or the apparent meaning of an election-related statute—can undermine the 
perceived legitimacy of the electoral process. 
Additionally, federal courts are responsible for enforcing the U.S. 
Constitution’s structural grants of authority to particular governmental 
entities.  As Professor Tribe has argued, when the Constitution specifies 
“how a decision otherwise internal to a state’s system of governance should 
be made, that provision’s enforcement is a matter for the federal judiciary, 
and ultimately the Supreme Court, subject to the political question 
doctrine.”200  James Madison expressly recognized during the constitutional 
convention that “[t]he State Judiciarys [sic] had not & he presumed wd. not 
be proposed as a proper source of appointment” of the presidential 
 
 195. See Wells & Netter, supra note 122, at 712 (“Article II serves as a guarantee that 
election rules are put in place before the election, so as to minimize the problem of self-dealing 
by partisan officials (whatever posts they hold) who know how their rulings will affect the 
outcome.”); cf. Issacharoff, supra note 107, at 639 (arguing that “the Court may well have 
been justified in its desire to expand constitutional scrutiny to cover on-the-run, post hoc 
alterations of electoral practices” but that “institutional actors” other than the Supreme Court 
are capable of enforcing such constraints). 
 196. Krent, supra note 111, at 496 (“State court judges might alter state law in a way that 
favors their own political leanings or futures.”); McConnell, supra note 96, at 662 (“A 
legislative code is enacted behind a veil of ignorance; no one knows (for sure) which rules 
will benefit which candidates . . . .  Courts and executive officials making judgments after the 
fact operate behind no such veil of ignorance.”); Wells & Netter, supra note 122, at 724–25.  
Professor Pildes makes the important point that, to the extent a federal court’s goal is to 
prevent a state court from making unexpected changes to state election law, it might 
reasonably choose to consider not only “written legal texts but . . . longstanding judicial and 
administrative practices consistent with those texts.” Pildes, supra note 121, at 708. 
 197. McConnell, supra note 96, at 662. 
 198. Pildes, supra note 121, at 694. 
 199. Krent, supra note 111, at 496, 508. 
 200. Tribe, supra note 120, at 188. 
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electors.201  To the extent the Constitution vests authority over federal 
elections specifically in the state legislature, a state court cannot be free to 
override or nullify the legislature’s prerogatives by imposing its own 
preferred policy or outcome under the guise of interpretation.202 
Professor Harold J. Krent suggests that the Framers may have chosen to 
delegate such power to the legislature because it “is directly accountable to 
the electorate and arguably is less likely subject to presidential influence than 
a governor hoping for a cabinet position (or other influence) or than a state 
judge hoping for elevation to the federal bench (or other position).”203  
Professor McConnell adds that the Presidential Electors Clause’s delegation 
of authority specifically to the legislature “ensures that the manner of 
selecting electors will be chosen by the most democratic branch of the state 
government.”204  Regardless of the reason for the Constitution’s use of this 
term—or whether the Framers’ choice of language was purposeful and 
deliberate—allowing some limited degree of federal review of state courts’ 
interpretations of laws governing federal elections may be a reasonable way 
of enforcing that allocation of authority.  From this perspective, it is entirely 
appropriate for federal courts to “see that all state actors stay within the 
original constitutional scheme” due to “the strong federal interest in the 
selection of the President.”205 
Any such review would have to be deferential to the state courts,206 
however, to ensure that federal courts do not simply substitute their own 
judgment for that of state courts concerning ambiguous language or 
reasonably debatable interpretations of state laws.207  Commentators have 
disagreed, however, over the degree of deference required.  Justice 
Rehnquist’s Bush v. Gore concurrence claims that Article II requires the 
Court to assess whether a state court has “impermissibly distorted” state law 
“beyond what a fair reading required.”208  Some commentators have adopted 
 
 201. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 110 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
 202. Krent, supra note 111, at 533–34. 
 203. Id. at 509. 
 204. McConnell, supra note 96, at 661. 
 205. Epstein, supra note 125, at 620; see also Pildes, supra note 121, at 693 (explaining 
that the “force” of the constitutional right to vote is “at its strongest when it comes to national 
elections—particularly elections for the Presidency”). 
 206. See Tribe, supra note 120, at 193 (“Some degree of deference, within an outer 
perimeter whose definition is, of course, a federal question, is required notwithstanding the 
presence of a controlling federal norm.”); Friedman, supra note 124, at 837 (“[T]he 
interpretations of the state supreme court are entitled to substantial deference.”).  But see Laura 
S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States:  Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-Law 
Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 88–89 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court should 
overturn state courts’ rulings on state law questions that are antecedent to federal claims only 
when there is a “concrete indication that the state court has deliberately manipulated state law 
to thwart federal law and then evade Supreme Court review”); Monaghan, supra note 125, 
at 1934 (arguing that Supreme Court review of state courts’ rulings concerning state law issues 
should be de novo). 
 207. Cf. Pildes, supra note 121, at 710 (noting the “real danger that federal courts will 
simply substitute their own judgment about the proper meaning of state law”). 
 208. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
2021] INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE 529 
a similar approach, calling on federal courts to assess whether state law 
offered “fair support” for the state court’s interpretation of the statutes at 
issue.209  This standard reflects Supreme Court precedents allowing the Court 
to “review and set aside a state supreme court’s interpretation of state law 
that lacks ‘fair and substantial’ or ‘adequate’ support when state courts use 
their interpretive powers over state law to thwart litigants’ efforts to vindicate 
their federal rights.”210 
Professor Krent contends that the Bush concurrence was not sufficiently 
deferential to the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state election 
code, however.211  He suggests that a federal court may step in only when 
“the state court’s construction is both unsupportable by reference to 
conventional textual analysis and relevant precedents and, in addition, 
threatens to gut the legislature’s control of the process to select presidential 
electors.”212  Other commentators likewise propose that Article II is violated 
only when the state court’s interpretation of state law is “clearly 
implausible,”213 “manifestly unreasonable,”214 or “a gross deviation from the 
scheme outlined in the statute.”215  Of course, however the standard is 
articulated, statutory interpretation unavoidably involves a degree of 
subjectivity and uncertainty,216 posing challenging questions about when a 
state court’s interpretation of state election laws is “too wrong.” 
Some courts have held that the Due Process Clause imposes somewhat 
comparable restrictions on courts’ interpretations of laws governing 
elections.217  In Roe v. Alabama (Roe I),218 for example, an Alabama statute 
required that absentee ballots be witnessed or notarized.219  A state court 
nevertheless ordered election officials to count ballots that did not meet these 
requirements.220  The leading candidates in two very close races, as well as 
 
 209. See Webb, supra note 145, at 1198; Pildes, supra note 88, at 10. 
 210. Mitchell, supra note 121, at 1356; see also Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 
321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944) (holding that the Court must consider whether a state court’s 
“non-federal grounds” for denying a federal constitutional claim “rest[ed] upon a fair or 
substantial basis”). 
 211. See Krent, supra note 111, at 496–97. 
 212. Id. at 533. 
 213. Friedman, supra note 124, at 841. 
 214. Tribe, supra note 120, at 193. 
 215. Epstein, supra note 125, at 619; see also Wells & Netter, supra note 122, at 728 
(suggesting that a federal court must assess whether a state court “brought about a major 
change in the rules as they existed before the election”). 
 216. See Epstein, supra note 125, at 634; see also Backer, supra note 143, at 1074 (“The 
difference between interpretation and legislation is merely a matter of degree.”). 
 217. See Pildes, supra note 121, at 702–06; cf. Issacharoff, supra note 107, at 641–42 n.21 
(arguing that constitutional protection against “after-the-fact alterations of electoral processes 
in a potentially outcome-determinative fashion” should not “be limited to presidential 
elections alone” under Article II but rather arise from “a more central constitutional 
command”). 
 218. 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 219. See id. at 577. 
 220. Id. at 578. 
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a voter who supported them, sued in federal court, claiming that this change 
in vote counting rules violated their due process rights.221 
The Eleventh Circuit certified a question about the proper interpretation of 
the statute at issue to the Alabama Supreme Court,222 which responded that 
unsigned, unnotarized ballots were valid and could be counted.223  The 
Eleventh Circuit ultimately concluded that adopting and applying such an 
unexpected departure from both the plain text of the statute and the state’s 
past practice after the election had already concluded was fundamentally 
unfair and violated due process.224  It explained that, if Alabama candidates 
and voters had known before the election that absentee ballots need not be 
witnessed and notarized, “campaign strategies would have taken this into 
account and supporters of [the plaintiff candidates] who did not vote would 
have voted absentee.”225 
Similarly, in Griffin v. Burns,226 Rhode Island election officials had 
permitted voters to cast absentee and shut-in ballots in primary elections for 
local offices.227  After the elections were over, one of the losing candidates 
sued, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court ordered the invalidation of all 
absentee and shut-in ballots because state law did not authorize their use in 
primary elections.228  The exclusion of those ballots changed the outcome of 
a race for the Democratic Party’s nomination for Providence city council.229 
Voters who had cast absentee and shut-in ballots sued in federal court, 
claiming that the retroactive application of the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s 
unexpected new interpretation of state law violated their constitutional 
rights.230  They pointed out that the state had authorized the use of absentee 
and shut-in ballots in primary elections over the previous seven years.231  The 
First Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ right to vote had been violated because 
election officials had “sanctioned the use of certain ballots” that the state 
supreme court “quashed after the results of the election were in.”232  
Retroactively applying such a material change in the rules governing an 
election “fail[ed] on its face to afford fundamental fairness.”233 
 
 221. Id. at 578–79. 
 222. Id. at 583. 
 223. See Roe v. Alabama (Roe II), 68 F.3d 404, 406 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 224. Id. at 408 (stating that the evidence in favor of the plaintiffs’ claim was even 
“stronger” than the court “could have expected”); see also Roe I, 43 F.3d at 581 (stating that 
counting absentee ballots that were neither witnessed nor notarized “implicate[s] fundamental 
fairness and the propriety of the two elections at issue”). 
 225. Roe I, 43 F.3d at 582.  The court further explained that counting votes which failed to 
satisfy statutory requirements “would dilute the votes of those voters who met the [statutory] 
requirements . . . as well as those voters who actually went to the polls on election day.” Id. at 
581. 
 226. 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978). 
 227. Id. at 1067. 
 228. Id. at 1068. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 1068–69. 
 231. Id. at 1079. 
 232. Id. at 1078–79. 
 233. Id. at 1078. 
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Thus, the Due Process Clause already empowers federal courts to 
determine whether a state court’s ruling effectively changed the rules of an 
election by unexpectedly and materially departing from a statute’s apparent 
meaning or a jurisdiction’s past practice—at least where voters had acted (or 
refrained from acting) in reasonable reliance on a particular understanding of 
the rules.234  The Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause may 
similarly prevent a state court from effectively changing the rules of an 
election in ways that can unfairly impact the outcome, even with regard to 
issues that do not implicate voters’ reliance interests. 
Miller v. Treadwell235 provides a good example of how the independent 
state legislature doctrine can be applied in this manner.  That case arose from 
U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski’s successful write-in campaign in the 2010 
Alaska Senate election.236  Alaska law specified that a write-in vote is valid 
only if it contains the name of a candidate “as it appears on the write-in 
declaration of candidacy.”237  The Alaska Supreme Court held that write-in 
votes in which a candidate’s name had apparently been misspelled—and 
therefore did not match the name on any declaration of candidacy—were 
nevertheless valid.238  A losing candidate challenged the results of the Senate 
race in federal court, arguing that counting misspelled write-in votes violated 
the Elections Clause because it was inconsistent with the plain text of the 
underlying statute.239  The district court determined that the Alaska Supreme 
Court’s interpretation was not “clearly contrary to the face of the statute and 
its findings were entirely consistent with the State’s past practice of making 
voter intent a priority.”240  Thus, after deferentially reviewing the state 
supreme court’s interpretation of state law, the federal district court rejected 
the Elections Clause claim.241 
Particularly for presidential elections, allowing federal courts to police the 
outer boundaries of state courts’ interpretations of state election laws may 
also deter far more potentially destabilizing responses by other governmental 
actors.  On the one hand, Congress might attempt to reject a state’s electoral 
votes if it concludes that the electors were appointed based on a state court’s 
material deviation from state law.242  Or a legislature may attempt to appoint 
 
 234. See Schapiro, supra note 121, at 104–05 (emphasizing that Roe II and Griffin 
vindicated voters’ reliance interests). 
 235. 736 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Alaska 2010). 
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its own competing slate of electors based on its interpretation of state law.243  
Allowing the federal judiciary to reaffirm the reasonableness of a state 
supreme court’s ruling—or to provide a judicial remedy for a patently 
unreasonable ruling—might reduce the likelihood that Congress or a 
legislature would attempt to resort to such extraordinary measures that seem 
much more likely to undermine public confidence in the electoral process. 
C.  Barring Federal Review Under the Political Question Doctrine 
During the 2020 election cycle, a few federal courts concerningly held or 
suggested that the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause barred 
them from adjudicating certain types of constitutional challenges to state 
election laws.  Under this problematic view, the Constitution’s grants of 
authority to legislatures to regulate federal elections preclude federal courts 
from reviewing at least some types of legislative action concerning such 
elections under the political question doctrine.  This reasoning rests in large 
part on the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Rucho v. Common Cause,244 
which cited the Elections Clause in support of its conclusion that political 
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable.245 
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State,246 
for example, held that a challenge to Florida’s seventy-year-old ballot-order 
statute was nonjusticiable.247  The law specified that, for each office, the 
candidate belonging to the incumbent governor’s political party must be 
listed first on the ballot, followed by the candidate of whichever party 
received the second-highest number of votes in the most recent gubernatorial 
election.248  After holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 
statute,249 the court went on to declare that their claims also raised 
nonjusticiable political questions.250 
The Eleventh Circuit explained that the plaintiffs did not contend that the 
ballot-order statute prevented anyone from voting or made it unduly 
burdensome for them to do so.251  Instead, they argued that the law “confers 
an unfair partisan advantage” on candidates of the governor’s party.252  The 
complaint asked the court “to pick among various conceptions of a politically 
‘fair’ ballot order that have no basis in the Constitution.”253  The court opined 
that, under Rucho, it was constitutionally inappropriate for a federal court to 
determine whether an election-related rule confers an unfair advantage on 
 
 243. See Wells & Netter, supra note 122, at 715; see also infra Part III.A. 
 244. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
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any particular political party.254  Citing the Elections Clause, the court later 
added, “Our founding charter never contemplated that federal courts would 
dictate the manner of conducting elections—in this lawsuit, down to the order 
in which candidates appear on a ballot.”255  Accordingly, the case presented 
“nonjusticiable political questions.”256  Some other courts have already 
applied Jacobson’s political question holding.257 
Jacobson’s conception of the political question doctrine in this context is 
quite narrow.  Jacobson readily acknowledges that the doctrine is 
inapplicable where a plaintiff alleges that a law “make[s] it more difficult for 
individuals to vote . . . or to choose the candidate of their choice.”258  Rather, 
under Jacobson, courts are barred from engaging in a subjective, ad hoc 
analysis of whether aspects of the election that do not impose burdens or 
restrictions on voters are fair.  As a practical matter, it seems likely that any 
case subject to dismissal as nonjusticiable under Jacobson could alternatively 
have been dismissed for failure to state a claim, due to the lack of an 
underlying constitutional restriction for the court to enforce.259  Treating the 
issue as a question of justiciability has some ancillary consequences, 
however.  For example, a court could consider a potential 
justiciability-related deficiency in a plaintiff’s claims sua sponte—and even 
for the first time on appeal. 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia’s ruling in 
Coalition for Good Governance v. Raffensperger260 adopted an even broader 
conception of the political question doctrine, declining jurisdiction over a 
sweepingly broad range of claims.261  The plaintiffs had brought a 
constitutional challenge to Georgia’s impending 2020 primary election.262  
They asked the district court to postpone the election, require the use of paper 
ballots instead of touchscreen ballot-marking devices, extend the deadline for 
the return of completed absentee ballots, and revise the instructions and 
internal processes for absentee voting.263 
 
 254. See id. at 1262. 
 255. Id. at 1269. 
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The district court held the case was nonjusticiable and dismissed it for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction.264  It explained, “The Framers of the 
Constitution did not envision a primary role for the courts in managing 
elections, but instead reserved election management to the legislatures . . . .  
[C]ourts should not substitute their own judgments for state election 
codes.”265  The court added that no “judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards” existed for determining whether state officials had done enough 
to respond to the risks of the COVID-19 pandemic.266  Coalition for Good 
Governance reflects a much broader understanding of the political question 
doctrine than Jacobson, invoking it even where plaintiffs challenged laws 
that they claimed unconstitutionally burdened their ability to vote. 
Likewise, in Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott,267 the plaintiffs argued that 
Texas’s election laws were unconstitutionally burdensome due to the 
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and asked the federal district court to order a 
panoply of more than a dozen reforms.268  Pointing out that the Constitution 
grants authority to the legislature to determine the “Manner” in which federal 
elections are conducted, the court held that the political question doctrine 
barred it from exercising jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims.269  The court 
explained that the plaintiffs were impermissibly asking it to “mandate and 
implement its own judgment about the proper administration of elections, 
thereby encroaching upon the ‘constitutional commitment’ of the 
administration of elections to the state legislatures and to Congress.”270 
The Fifth Circuit reversed in relevant part, holding that the plaintiffs’ 
claims alleging racial discrimination in violation of the Constitution and 
Voting Rights Act were justiciable and did not constitute political 
questions.271  It did not address the justiciability of the plaintiffs’ other 
constitutional challenges under the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
because it concluded they were properly dismissed on other grounds.272  
Other courts have likewise properly rejected such political question 
arguments.273 
 
 264. Id. at *3–4. 
 265. Id. at *3. 
 266. Id.; see also id. (“[W]hether the executive branch has done enough is a classic political 
question involving policy choices.”). 
 267. 484 F. Supp. 3d 435 (W.D. Tex. 2020), rev’d in part and remanded, 977 F.3d 461 (5th 
Cir. 2020). 
 268. Id. at 440. 
 269. Id. at 448. 
 270. Id. at 444 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
 271. 977 F.3d 461, 467 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Texas Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 
F.3d 389 (5th Cir. 2020) (exercising jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge alleging that 
Texas’s rules for absentee voting were unduly burdensome as applied in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic). 
 272. Mi Familia Vota, 977 F.3d at 467. 
 273. See, e.g., Harding v. Edwards, 484 F. Supp. 3d 299, 306–07 (M.D. La. 2020); People 
First of Ala. v. Merrill, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1205 (N.D. Ala.), stay denied, 815 F. App’x 
505 (11th Cir.), stay granted, 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020); Middleton v. Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d 
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As Rucho demonstrates, certain aspects of the political question doctrine 
blur the line between nonjusticiability and failure to state a claim.  The 
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, however, do not purport 
to limit the federal judiciary’s jurisdiction.  The Bill of Rights, 
Reconstruction Amendments, and subsequent voting rights amendments cut 
across those clauses, limiting the scope of power they convey.274  When 
plaintiffs allege a violation of their constitutional rights or federal 
voting-related statutes, they raise a federal question appropriate for judicial 
resolution.275  Of course, a plaintiff’s allegations may not actually amount to 
a constitutional or statutory violation, or a plaintiff may challenge a policy 
decision within the legislature’s constitutional discretion.  But the proper 
response should generally be to dismiss the claim on the merits rather than to 
hold that the court lacks power to even consider it in the first place. 
II.  THE DOCTRINE AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
One of the independent state legislature doctrine’s most controversial 
potential applications is allowing legislatures to regulate federal elections 
“independently” of state constitutions.  As discussed above,276 under this 
claimed corollary to the doctrine, a legislature’s authority to regulate federal 
elections remains restricted by the implicit limitations of the Elections Clause 
and the Presidential Electors Clause; the express limitations of the Bill of 
Rights, Reconstruction Amendments, and other constitutional amendments 
protecting voting rights; and federal statutes.277  Legislatures are also subject 
to the state constitution’s procedural requirements governing the lawmaking 
process.278  Under this theory, however, the state constitution may not 
impose additional substantive limits or restrictions on the scope of the 
authority that the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause grant 
specifically to the state legislature to regulate federal elections. 
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A.  Substantive Restrictions on Legislatures’ Authority 
In earlier work, I detailed the history of this aspect of the independent state 
legislature doctrine,279 so this section presents only a brief summary.  There 
does not appear to be any indication that the Framers specifically considered 
whether legislatures would be bound by the substantive constraints of their 
state constitutions, either at the Constitutional Convention or during the 
ratification debates.280  The earliest known example of the doctrine’s 
invocation appears to be the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 
1820.281  Justice Joseph Story successfully argued against a proposal to 
include a provision in the Massachusetts Constitution that would require the 
state to appoint members of Congress and presidential electors from 
individual districts rather than at-large.282  He explained that the proposed 
amendment was “plainly a violation of the [U.S.] [C]onstitution,” because 
the Convention did not “have a right to insert in our [state] constitution a 
provision which controls or destroys a discretion . . . which must be exercised 
by the Legislature, in virtue of powers confided to it by the constitution of 
the United States.”283 
On three known occasions in the nineteenth century, state supreme courts 
issued advisory opinions concerning conflicts, or potential conflicts, between 
a state statute (or piece of proposed legislation) and the state constitution with 
regard to federal elections.  In each of those matters, the court concluded that 
the legislative measure would be enforceable, even if it were contrary to a 
state constitutional provision.284  For example, in In re Plurality Elections,285 
the Rhode Island Constitution required candidates to receive a majority of 
votes to win an election, while a state law allowed congressional candidates 
to win with only a plurality.286  The Rhode Island Supreme Court questioned 
whether that state constitutional provision applied to congressional 
elections.287  To the extent it did apply to such races, however, that provision 
was “of no effect, except in so far as it may be voluntarily deferred to by the 
general assembly as an indication of the popular will.”288  The court went on 
to reiterate that, if the state constitution’s majority-vote requirement were 
“construed to extend” to congressional elections, then it would be “in conflict 
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with” the Elections Clause because it would “impose a restraint upon the 
power of prescribing the manner of holding such elections which is given to 
the legislature by the constitution of the United States without restraint.”289  
The court applied the same reasoning with regard to presidential elections 
and the Presidential Electors Clause.290 
The doctrine was invoked during the nineteenth century by both the U.S. 
House and U.S. Senate in resolving multiple election contests, as well.291  In 
Baldwin v. Trowbridge,292 for example, the state constitution required people 
to cast their votes in person at their precinct, while a state law allowed 
military voters serving in the Union Army to cast absentee ballots.293  The 
independent state legislature doctrine was repeatedly invoked throughout 
debates in the House concerning those absentee ballots.294  The House 
concluded that the absentee ballots at issue were valid because a state 
constitution could not limit the legislature’s power to regulate federal 
elections.295 
The U.S. Supreme Court likewise discussed the doctrine approvingly.  In 
the 1892 case McPherson v. Blacker,296 in the course of upholding a 
Michigan law awarding presidential electors by congressional district, the 
Court quoted a U.S. Senate report for the proposition that the authority 
conferred by the Presidential Electors Clause 
cannot be taken from [state legislatures] or modified by their State 
constitutions any more than can [their] power to elect Senators of the 
United States.  Whatever provisions may be made by statute, or by the state 
constitution, to choose electors by the people, there is no doubt of the right 
of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken 
away nor abdicated.297 
The Court went on to apply this aspect of the doctrine in cases dealing with 
Article V’s delegation of authority specifically to state legislatures to ratify 
federal constitutional amendments.298  Most notably, in Leser v. Garnett,299 
litigants challenged the validity of the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification 
on the grounds that some state constitutions barred their legislatures from 
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 298. See, e.g., Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 225 (1920) (holding that a legislature’s 
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ratifying such an amendment.300  Rejecting that argument, the Court held that 
ratification of federal constitutional amendments “is a federal function 
derived from the Federal Constitution; and it transcends any limitations 
sought to be imposed by the people of a State.”301 
In 2015, however, the 5–4 majority in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission tersely rejected this corollary of the 
doctrine.302  The Court declared, “Nothing in [the Elections] Clause instructs, 
nor has this Court ever held, that a state legislature may prescribe regulations 
on the time, place, and manner of holding federal elections in defiance of 
provisions of the State’s constitution.”303  It rejected any comparison to 
Article V precedents like Leser on the grounds that the ratification of 
constitutional amendments differed from redistricting and passing laws to 
regulate federal elections.304  The Court likewise dismissed Baldwin v. 
Trowbridge as base partisan politics, without acknowledging the other 
occasions on which the doctrine was applied throughout the nineteenth 
century.305 
During the 2020 election cycle, several Justices indicated their openness 
to this strand of the independent state legislature doctrine.  The Pennsylvania 
legislature had enacted a statute, Act 77, to modify the rules governing the 
state’s elections in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.306  That law 
permitted the entire electorate to vote by mail, but “unambiguously required 
that all mailed ballots be received by 8 p.m. on election day.”307  The statute 
also had a nonseverability clause, specifying that if the deadline were held 
unconstitutional, most of the law—including the establishment of universal 
no-excuse absentee voting—would be void, as well.308  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court ruled that this deadline violated the state constitution as 
applied during the pandemic.309  It held that absentee ballots would be valid 
so long as they were postmarked by Election Day and received by election 
officials within the following three days.310  Absentee ballots without 
postmarks were likewise deemed valid so long as they were received within 
three days after Election Day.311  The court did not implement the 
nonseverability provision.312 
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 301. Id. at 137. 
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In mid-October 2020, one week before Justice Barrett was confirmed to 
the U.S. Supreme Court,313 the Court denied a motion to stay the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling by a 4–4 vote, allowing that ruling to 
remain in effect.314  The Pennsylvania Republican Party then asked the Court 
to resolve the case on an expedited basis, but the Court unanimously denied 
that request.315  Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion in which Justices 
Thomas and Gorsuch joined, agreeing that there was “simply not enough 
time at this late date to decide the question before the election.”316  The three 
Justices opined, however, that “there is a strong likelihood that the State 
Supreme Court decision violates the Federal Constitution.”317  They 
explained that the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause “would 
be meaningless if a state court could override the rules adopted by the 
legislature simply by claiming that a state constitutional provision gave the 
courts the authority to make whatever rules it thought appropriate for the 
conduct of a fair election.”318 
About a week later, the Court ordered all Pennsylvania county boards of 
election to segregate any absentee ballots received within the three-day 
period following Election Day.319  When there turned out to be far too few 
such ballots to affect the outcome of Pennsylvania’s election, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in the case.320  Justices Thomas and Alito both 
dissented from the denial of certiorari, reiterating their support for this aspect 
of the independent state legislature doctrine and emphasizing the need to 
resolve the issue in advance of future federal elections.321  Thus, there is a 
reasonable potential basis in text, history, and precedent for the Court to 
conclude that state constitutions may not impose substantive restrictions on 
state laws regulating federal elections. 
Though this strand of the independent state legislature doctrine has 
received some academic support,322 numerous commentators have come out 
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against it,323 while others have expressed doubts.324  For example, Professor 
Robert A. Schapiro has forcefully argued that this approach “extract[s] the 
state legislature from its constitutional setting . . . .  [T]he relationship among 
state courts, state legislatures, and state constitutions can be conceived of as 
cooperative, rather than adversarial.”325  Professor James Gardner adds that 
there is “little reason . . . to think that the people of any state would be 
particularly inclined to trust their state legislature to perform the critical task 
of selecting presidential electors completely free of popular guidance and 
constraints applied by constitutional means.”326  He notes that “there is a long 
American history of popular distrust of state legislatures and of 
corresponding efforts to use state constitutions to curb undesirable legislative 
behavior.”327 
As mentioned earlier, even if the Court were to accept this potential 
implication of the independent state legislature doctrine, state legislatures 
would still be constrained in a variety of ways.  For example, the Supreme 
Court has held that the Elections Clause implicitly prohibits a state from 
“dictat[ing] electoral outcomes, . . . favor[ing] or disfavor[ing] a class of 
candidates, or . . . evad[ing] important constitutional restraints.”328  Since the 
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause are often construed in pari 
materia, these restrictions likely carry over to presidential elections, as well.  
Legislatures would also remain subject to the U.S. Constitution’s express 
restrictions, such as the Bill of Rights as incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the substantive restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, 
and subsequent voting rights amendments.329  Many state constitutional 
provisions either have analogues in the U.S. Constitution or have been 
construed materially similarly to the U.S. Constitution, so the consequences 
of imposing this restriction would be limited.330  Additionally, legislatures 
would remain bound by the restrictions of federal laws, such as the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.331  The Court might minimize potential disruptions by 
applying this aspect of the doctrine prospectively, allowing continued 
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enforcement of existing state constitutional provisions that regulate federal 
elections as default sources of law, unless and until a state legislature enacts 
a contrary statute. 
Thus, rather than dangerously unshackling legislatures, one of the main 
consequences of this aspect of the independent state legislature doctrine may 
be to promote predictability in federal elections by preventing state supreme 
courts from changing the rules and potentially impacting outcomes based on 
new, unexpected applications of broad or vague provisions of state 
constitutions.  An accompanying drawback, however, is that such 
interpretations of state constitutions would remain enforceable with regard to 
state and local elections, leading to different sets of rules governing elections 
for different offices. 
B.  Procedural Restrictions on Legislatures’ Authority 
Even if state constitutions are incapable of imposing substantive 
restrictions on the power that the U.S. Constitution confers upon state 
legislatures to regulate federal elections, they still may regulate the process 
by which legislatures enact such laws.  Conceptually, the fact that the 
Constitution grants a legislature the authority to enact laws regulating federal 
elections does not suggest that the legislature is exempt from its ordinary 
legislative process when exercising that power.332 
Historically, the independent state legislature doctrine was not applied to 
exempt state laws governing federal elections from the ordinary legislative 
process.333  To the contrary, in the years following the Constitution’s 
adoption, the two governors that held a veto power decided whether to 
approve or reject state laws regulating federal elections.334 
The Supreme Court has recognized this principle for over a century, as 
well.  In Smiley v. Holm,335 the Court held that state laws governing federal 
elections may be subject to gubernatorial veto.336  It explained that, because 
the Elections Clause grants legislatures authority “for the purpose of making 
laws for the State, it follows, in the absence of an indication of a contrary 
intent, that the exercise of the authority must be in accordance with the 
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method which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments.”337  
Likewise, the Court interprets its ruling in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant338 
as allowing state legislative bills concerning federal elections, including 
congressional redistricting maps, to be subject to a public referendum before 
taking legal effect.339  Thus, even if the Court were to revitalize portions of 
the independent state legislature doctrine, it need not exempt state laws 
regulating federal elections from the ordinary legislative process.  Regardless 
of whether state constitutions may limit the content of such laws, state 
constitutions may regulate the process through which legislatures adopt 
them. 
III.  THE DOCTRINE AND STATE LEGISLATURES 
A.  Direct Legislative Appointment of Presidential Electors 
One of the most significant potential implications of the independent state 
legislature doctrine concerns the scope of a state legislature’s power to 
directly appoint presidential electors.  The Supreme Court has recognized 
that the Presidential Electors Clause grants a legislature “plenary” authority 
over the manner in which its state’s electors are appointed.340  In Bush v. 
Gore, the Court reiterated that a legislature “may, if it so chooses, select the 
electors itself.”341  Some legislatures directly appointed presidential electors 
without a popular vote during the first century of our nation’s history.342  
Those precedents confirm the constitutional prerogative of a legislature to 
decide, well in advance of an election cycle, to directly appoint presidential 
electors itself instead of holding a popular election.  Given the central role of 
popular presidential elections in American political culture, however, a 
legislature is unlikely to exercise this option today. 
The more difficult issue is whether the Presidential Electors Clause 
empowers a legislature to directly appoint a slate of presidential electors 
when state law specifies that electors must be appointed based on the results 
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of a popular election and authorizes only an executive official, such as the 
governor or secretary of state, to certify the election results and resulting 
appointments.  This is not a purely hypothetical question.  In 2000, as 
disputes over the presidential election wound their way through the courts, 
the Florida House of Representatives voted to appoint a slate of Republican 
electors to support then-candidate George W. Bush.343  The legislature did 
not proceed with the plan because the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Bush’s 
favor before the Florida Senate had the opportunity to consider the issue.344  
Following the 2020 election, President Trump’s campaign sought to persuade 
Republican legislators in states where he had lost the popular vote to appoint 
competing slates of Republican electors, based on unsubstantiated 
allegations of voter fraud.345  Despite such pressure, “no legislative house 
took steps in 2020 after Election Day to appoint electors [directly] . . . 
whether by purported legislative resolution or through the regular legislative 
process.”346 
Legislatures might attempt to directly appoint electors for a variety of 
reasons.  The strongest normative grounds for direct legislative appointment 
is if a major unexpected disaster such as Hurricane Katrina strikes on, or 
shortly before, Election Day, making it impossible to conduct the election or 
determine the results.347  The Constitution requires all presidential electors 
to cast their electoral votes on the same day,348 which Congress has set in 
mid-December.349  Congress meets in joint session shortly thereafter, the 
following January 6, to count the electoral votes,350 and the new president’s 
term begins on January 20.351  If a natural disaster prevents a substantial 
portion—and potentially even a majority—of a state’s electorate from voting 
on Election Day, it may be impossible for that state to simply reschedule its 
election or switch to an all-mail election at the last minute.352 
As discussed below, federal law contemplates the possibility that a 
catastrophe might require legislatures to appoint electors at some point after 
 
 343. Jeffrey Gettleman, Florida House OKs Slate of Electors Beholden to Bush, L.A. TIMES 
(Dec. 13, 2000, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-dec-13-mn-
64909-story.html [https://perma.cc/82WD-V6Q8]. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Deanna Paul, Trump Campaign Wants States to Override Electoral Votes for Biden.  
Is That Possible?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2020, 10:48 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
trump-campaign-wants-states-to-override-electoral-votes-for-biden-is-that-possible-
11605973695 [https://perma.cc/JJ2W-QY7P]. 
 346. Justin Levitt, Failed Elections and the Legislative Selection of Presidential Electors, 
96 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 18), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3714294 [https://perma.cc/843U-AAW7]. 
 347. See Morley, supra note 82, at 559–63 (explaining how Hurricane Katrina required 
cancellation of local and parish-level elections). 
 348. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
 349. 3 U.S.C. § 7. 
 350. Id. § 15; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by id. amend. XII. 
 351. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1. 
 352. See Michael T. Morley, Postponing Federal Elections Due to Election Emergencies, 
77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 179, 194–95 (2020). 
544 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
Election Day.353  Ideally, each state should enact an election emergency law 
to authorize its legislature to appoint electors in the unlikely event that such 
extreme circumstances arise, to ensure the state is able to cast its electoral 
votes.  Such express statutory authorization would avoid unnecessary 
uncertainty as to the scope of the legislature’s power. 
A legislature might also claim authority to appoint a slate of electors in the 
extreme case where a state is unable to finish tallying and canvassing the 
results of the popular election in time to certify a slate of electors pursuant to 
the statutory process.  This was a concern in the 2020 election cycle; states 
faced historically high numbers of absentee ballots due to COVID-19, yet a 
few swing states’ laws did not allow their election officials to begin 
reviewing such ballots until Election Day.354  During the primaries that 
summer, New York took approximately a month and a half to determine the 
results of two congressional races, which involved only a fraction of the 
ballots that would be cast in the presidential race.355  Again, to the extent 
states conclude that an emergency fallback mechanism is necessary, the best 
alternative is to provide statutory authorization for the direct legislative 
appointment of electors in the rare, extreme case where the state, despite its 
best efforts, is unable to complete the ordinary statutory certification process.  
North Carolina has adopted such a law.356  One potential concern about such 
a statute, however, is that it may incentivize state officials or candidates to 
seek to delay or derail the ballot-counting process to allow a friendly 
legislature to determine which electors to appoint.  A possible, though highly 
imperfect, way of attempting to address such concerns would be for the 
statute to specify that the legislature’s appointments must reflect its 
good-faith assessment of the apparent will of the state’s electorate, taking 
into account any completed tallies, as well as reasonable estimates of 
uncounted votes. 
More controversially, a legislature might also attempt to assert the right to 
appoint its own slate of electors without statutory authorization as an 
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institutional self-defense mechanism.  The Presidential Electors Clause 
empowers a state’s legislature to determine the “Manner” in which the state’s 
electors will be appointed.357  A legislature might contend that, when state 
officials or courts depart from the apparent meaning of state laws governing 
presidential elections to reach unexpected, atextual results, they infringe on 
the legislature’s constitutional prerogative to determine how such elections 
must be conducted.358  In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, for 
example, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously stepped in to seek clarity 
about whether the Florida Supreme Court was adhering to the Florida 
Election Code rather than implementing extrinsic authorities such as the state 
constitution.359 
Certiorari is purely discretionary, however, and the Court typically does 
not intervene in litigation solely to correct errors.360  A legislature might 
contend that the Presidential Electors Clause empowers it to appoint a slate 
of electors reflecting the election’s results based on the plain meaning of laws 
it enacted, instead of having to rely on the Supreme Court to enforce those 
laws and prevent state officials or judges from implementing their own 
preferences or idiosyncratic interpretations instead.  This appears to be the 
Florida legislature’s rationale for taking steps to appoint the Republican slate 
of electors as litigation concerning the 2000 presidential election 
proceeded.361  To the extent the federal judiciary in general or the Supreme 
Court in particular is available to act as a potential check against patently 
unreasonable interpretations of state laws governing federal elections, 
however, such judicial review would be far preferable to the extraordinary, 
disruptive, and unavoidably partisan possible alternative of a legislature’s 
attempted direct appointment of its own slate of electors.  Moreover, if the 
Constitution’s grants of authority over federal elections to the “Legislature” 
do not impose any enforceable limits on how state officials or courts may 
interpret state laws governing such elections,362 then a legislature would have 
no basis for attempting to enforce such limits by appointing its own electors.  
In any event, as discussed below, substantial legal obstacles exist to direct 
legislative appointment under such circumstances. 
Finally—and most disturbingly—a legislature might attempt to claim 
power to simply disregard the results of a popular presidential election and 
appoint a slate of electors reflecting its own partisan preferences.  Such a step 
would be historically unprecedented, fly directly in the face of our 
democratic traditions, and likely destabilize the entire presidential election.  
Once a legislature has made the decision to award presidential electors based 
on a popular vote and the election has been conducted, it would be both 
 
 357. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 358. See supra Part I.B. 
 359. 531 U.S. 70, 76–78 (2000) (per curiam). 
 360. See Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 11 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting E. 
GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 5.12(c)(3) (9th ed. 2007)). 
 361. See Gettleman, supra note 343 (“Republican lawmakers have argued that the election 
court battles ‘tainted’ Florida’s electoral votes . . . .”). 
 362. See supra Part I.B. 
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unjustifiable and disastrous for the legislature to unilaterally decide to ignore 
the will of the people. 
Whatever the rationale, several major legal impediments exist to a 
legislature’s direct appointment of its own slate of electors pursuant to the 
Presidential Electors Clause.  First, in nearly every state, direct appointment 
by the legislature would violate state law and potentially the state 
constitution.363  A legislature might claim, however, that McPherson v. 
Blacker allows it to appoint its own electors regardless of the certification 
process set forth in state law.  McPherson states that a legislature’s “plenary” 
power to appoint electors “can neither be taken away nor abdicated,” 
regardless of “[w]hatever provisions may be made by statute, or by the state 
constitution.”364  Under this potential view of the independent state 
legislature doctrine, state-level legal provisions governing a state’s 
presidential election process cannot constrain the legislature’s authority 
under the U.S. Constitution to appoint its own slate of electors. 
McPherson need not be read, however, as granting legislatures authority 
to appoint their own slates of electors in the face of state laws establishing a 
different certification process.  Most basically, the Court’s sweeping 
assertion was dicta.  McPherson was not addressing whether a legislature 
may directly appoint electors outside of the statutory process that the 
legislature itself has established to govern presidential elections.  To the 
contrary, the Court was considering the constitutionality of Michigan’s 
system of appointing electors by district rather than on a statewide basis.365 
Furthermore, although McPherson acknowledged that a state legislature 
has inalienable plenary authority to determine the manner in which electors 
are appointed, it did not address how the legislature must exercise that power.  
McPherson is consistent with the notion that, once a legislature has enacted 
laws requiring electors to be appointed based on the outcome of the popular 
vote as certified by state election officials, the legislature must amend or 
repeal those laws—subject to the possibility of gubernatorial veto—if it 
wishes to directly appoint electors rather than attempt to act in contravention 
of those provisions pursuant to the Presidential Electors Clause.366 
Finally, from a pragmatic perspective, a competing slate of electors 
selected by a state legislature would likely destabilize the presidential 
election—especially if it was potentially dispositive in the Electoral College.  
 
 363.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 102.111, 103.111 (2021).  Michigan has a statute which 
appears to allow the legislature to review the results of statewide elections, including 
presidential elections, in certain circumstances. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.846 (2021) 
(“When the determination of the board of state canvassers is contested, the legislature in joint 
convention shall decide which person is elected.”).  Additionally, as noted earlier, North 
Carolina authorizes direct appointment by the legislature when the state has been unable to 
certify its electors through the ordinary statutory process. See supra note 356 and 
accompanying text. 
 364. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395 (1874)). 
 365. Id. at 25 (“If the legislature possesses plenary authority to direct the manner of 
appointment, . . . it is difficult to perceive why, if the legislature prescribes as a method of 
appointment choice by vote, it must necessarily be by general ticket and not by districts.”). 
 366. See Levitt, supra note 346, at 11–12. 
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Congress would have to decide which of the state’s competing slates to count 
under 3 U.S.C. § 15.367  If both presidential candidates could plausibly claim 
to have won a majority of electoral votes based on competing slates of 
electors from a state, the public would be far less likely to accept the 
election’s results.  The January 6, 2021, Capitol riot frightfully demonstrates 
how even unsubstantiated allegations about the purported invalidity of a 
presidential election can instigate violence.368 
Federal law further constrains a legislature’s ability to directly appoint 
electors outside the statutory process for certifying election results.  The 
Presidential Election Day Act369 specifies that electors “shall be appointed” 
on Election Day (that is, the first Tuesday after the first Monday in 
November).370  Congress enacted this law pursuant to its constitutional 
authority to “determine the Time of chusing the Electors.”371  The statute 
cannot be taken completely at face value.  Electors are not actually appointed, 
and many votes are not even necessarily cast, on Election Day itself.372  
Nevertheless, the statute requires each state to appoint a slate of electors 
based on the results of an election that culminated on Election Day.373  A 
state legislature cannot simply decide that it dislikes the candidate the people 
elected and, after Election Day, appoint the other candidate’s slate of 
presidential electors.  Such a competing slate of electors would be divorced 
from, and even contrary to, the results of the election held on Election Day 
in compliance with federal law.  A legislature’s appointment of electors 
under such circumstances would amount to an illegal new election, held after 
the day specified in federal law. 
The Presidential Election Day Act provides an important exception.  It 
specifies that when a state has held an election but “failed to make a choice” 
on Election Day, electors “may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a 
manner as the legislature . . . may direct.”374  This provision was adopted in 
part to allow states to hold their elections at a later date if a natural disaster 
prevents voting on Election Day.375  Thus, if a state were unable to hold or 
complete a popular vote for president due to a massive disaster, such as 
Hurricane Katrina, the Presidential Election Day Act would not preclude the 
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legislature from directly appointing electors at a later date, so long as it is 
before the day when the electors cast their electoral votes.376 
It is less clear whether the Presidential Election Day Act bars a legislature 
from appointing a slate of electors based on its view of the legally correct 
results of the election that culminated on Election Day.377  Under such 
circumstances, the legislature would likely argue that it is not violating the 
Act by holding a belated new election, but rather attempting to enforce the 
results of the election held in compliance with the Act.  The Presidential 
Election Day Act was enacted pursuant to Congress’s authority to regulate 
the “Time” of presidential elections.378  It is uncertain whether the Act is 
violated when the “wrong” entity under state law purports to determine the 
election’s results and certify a corresponding slate of electors.  Of course, as 
a practical matter, it may often be difficult to determine whether a legislature 
is actually attempting to implement the results of a presidential election based 
on its interpretation of state law or instead imposing its partisan preferences 
by appointing electors to vote for its preferred candidate.  And, as noted 
before, one might reject the notion that the Presidential Electors Clause 
implicitly restricts how state courts or officials may interpret state laws 
governing federal elections. 
A third barrier to a legislature’s direct appointment of electors in violation 
of state law is the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause.  In Bush v. Gore, 
the Supreme Court held that, once a state decides to award its electors based 
on a popular vote, the constitutional right to vote attaches.379  As discussed 
earlier,380 several circuits have held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause prohibits states from changing the rules of an election after 
voters have already acted in reliance on them.381  A legislature’s decision to 
appoint its own slate of electors after an election has already been held would 
obviously be a substantial after-the-fact change in the rules governing the 
election that would likely violate the constitutional right to vote. 
A legislature might attempt to argue in response, however, that these due 
process cases apply only where voters acted in reasonable reliance on a 
particular interpretation of state law.382  It may be challenging for voters to 
plausibly claim that they would have made different voting-related decisions 
if they had known that the legislature, rather than state election officials, 
would be determining the validity of the votes cast and deciding the 
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election’s outcome.  Moreover, a legislature might claim to be defending the 
right to vote, to the extent it seeks to prevent state officials or courts from 
changing the rules of the election after votes have been cast through 
unexpected interpretations of state law. 
In conclusion, direct legislative appointment of presidential electors 
despite state laws providing for a popular election is an extreme measure that 
raises serious risks of undermining the public’s willingness to accept the 
results of a presidential election.  It flies in the face of the democratic tradition 
of popular presidential elections and creates a substantial risk that partisan 
manipulation will override the will of the people.  Direct legislative 
appointment of electors is most defensible only as a response to a major 
disaster that would otherwise prevent a state from casting electoral votes in 
a presidential election.383  To alleviate any doubts about the validity of such 
measures, states should enact election emergency laws that clearly specify 
the narrow circumstances under which the legislature may exercise such 
extraordinary authority. 
Conversely, direct legislative appointment is patently impermissible when 
a legislature seeks to appoint its own preferred electors as a partisan 
maneuver without regard to the popular vote.  A legislature’s direct 
appointment of electors is also both legally and prudentially problematic if 
used as a means of allowing the legislature to override a state official’s or 
court’s unexpected, purportedly incorrect interpretations or applications of 
state election laws.  Such a legislatively sanctioned competing slate of 
electors would likely exacerbate tensions over a hotly contested election.  
The federal judiciary, and the U.S. Supreme Court in particular, could reduce 
or eliminate any potential perceived need for legislatures to engage in such 
self-help measures by enforcing boundaries on the ability of state courts and 
officials to interpret state laws governing federal elections in unexpected, 
atextual ways.384  And when a federal court affirms the reasonableness of the 
state official’s or court’s interpretation of a disputed state law, the legislature 
would no longer have a colorable basis for asserting a need to protect either 
its constitutional prerogatives or the voting rights of the state’s citizens.  At 
the very least, as a matter of norms and political culture, presidential 
candidates, legislators, and their supporters must avoid resorting to 
consideration of direct legislative appointment of competing slates of 
electors as a means of resolving electoral disputes or overcoming 
disappointing electoral results. 
B.  Regulating Federal Elections Outside of Institutional Legislatures 
Another potential implication of the independent state legislature doctrine 
is that it may preclude states from regulating federal elections through 
legislative processes outside of the institutional legislature, such as a public 
initiative.  Since the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause 
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specifically delegate authority to regulate federal elections to the 
“Legislature” of each state, this question turns on the meaning of the term 
“Legislature.” 
The Constitution includes several vague terms that allude to broad 
principles, such as “due process of law” and “equal protection of the laws.”385  
Other constitutional concepts appear to call for the exercise of at least some 
degree of judgment, such as “necessary and proper.”386  The term 
“Legislature,” in contrast, seems definite, specific, and concrete.  Based on 
the Constitution’s references to the term “Legislature” apart from the 
Electors Clause and Presidential Electors Clause,387 it appears that the term 
refers to a “representative body which ma[kes] the laws of the people.”388  
Moreover, “every state constitution from the Founding Era that used the term 
legislature defined it as a distinct multimember entity comprised of 
representatives.”389  Indeed, the Supreme Court adopted this interpretation of 
the term for purposes of Article V of the Constitution,390 which empowers 
the “Legislature” of each state to ratify constitutional amendments.391  Thus, 
from a plain meaning, original understanding, and intratextual approach,392 
a state’s institutional legislature is the only state entity that may regulate 
federal elections without relying on a statutory delegation of authority.393 
In Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, however, a sharply 
divided 5–4 Court rejected this interpretation of “Legislature.”394  Drawing 
on precedent, the Court held that the term has a different meaning as used in 
the Elections Clause (and, by extension, the Presidential Electors Clause) 
than it does in the rest of the Constitution.395  The Court explained that 
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2021] INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE DOCTRINE 551 
“Legislature” means any power or process that is authorized to make laws 
within a state.396  Although it cited some Founding Era dictionaries, the Court 
primarily applied a purposivist interpretation of the Elections Clause.397  It 
explained that “[t]he dominant purpose of the Elections Clause . . . was to 
empower Congress to override state election rules, not to restrict the way 
States enact legislation.”398  The Framers could not have intended for the 
Elections Clause to prohibit states from regulating federal elections through 
the public initiative process, since that process had not yet been developed at 
the time of the Constitution’s adoption.399  Accordingly, the majority held 
that the Elections Clause should not be read to hinder the people’s ability to 
govern themselves through direct democracy.400  The Court concluded that, 
because the Arizona constitution allows the state’s electorate to legislate 
through a public initiative process, that process qualifies as a “Legislature” 
for purposes of the Elections Clause.401  The people of Arizona may therefore 
use the initiative process to enact laws regulating federal elections. 
The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission majority did not 
address the fact that, throughout their debates at the constitutional 
convention, the Framers consistently distinguished “between a state 
legislature and direct collective action by the people of a state.”402  This 
distinction is reflected in the Constitution’s text and structure.  As originally 
adopted, the Constitution required Representatives to be directly elected by 
the people, while senators were to be appointed by state legislatures.403  
Moreover, the majority provided no evidence from the Constitution’s text, 
drafting history, or ratification history to support the implausible notion that 
the Framers used the term “Legislature” to mean different things at different 
points in the document, surreptitiously changing its meaning from clause to 
clause.  Thus, the majority’s purposivist reasoning appears to rest on shaky 
ground. 
In short, a strong argument can be made that the only entity within a state 
that may adopt laws governing federal elections is the institutional 
legislature.  The legislature may delegate rulemaking authority to election 
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officials, or even statutorily authorize an independent redistricting 
commission to develop nonpartisan congressional maps.404  Under this 
approach, when state or local officials purport to regulate federal elections, 
they must be able to point to some grant of authority specifically from the 
institutional legislature; a state’s electorate may not adopt laws regulating 
federal elections through a public initiative process.405 
Importantly, if the Court were to adopt this interpretation, it need not apply 
its ruling retroactively to invalidate existing election laws that had been 
enacted via an initiative process or otherwise apart from the institutional 
legislature.406  Rather, the Court may make its ruling prospectively 
applicable only in the case before it and as to future state statutes.  And even 
if the ruling were retroactively applicable, a legislature would remain free to 
immediately readopt any provisions of state law that had been enacted 
through an improper channel. 
Current Supreme Court doctrine, however, rejects any variation of this 
potential application of the independent state legislature doctrine.407  Under 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, a state may use any 
lawmaking process authorized by the state constitution, such as a public 
initiative, to regulate federal elections.408 
C.  Stripping Institutional Legislatures of Authority to Regulate Federal 
Elections 
A closely related issue under the independent state legislature doctrine is 
whether a state may partly or completely strip its institutional legislature of 
authority to regulate federal elections and transfer that power exclusively to 
some other entity.  Under this potential aspect of the doctrine, the term 
“Legislature” as used in the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors 
Clause must, at the very least, include a state’s institutional legislature, 
regardless of whether it also includes other processes and entities.409  
Accordingly, an institutional legislature may not be excluded from regulating 
federal elections, or certain aspects of those elections, even if the state 
constitution may place side constraints on that power.410 
Professor Derek Muller has forcefully advocated this position.411  He 
points out that adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment412 was necessary to 
authorize popular elections for U.S. Senators because “neither a popular 
initiative nor a legislative act” could stop a legislature from “exercis[ing] its 
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own judgment and final authority in senate elections.”413  In other words, 
prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, a state could neither strip an 
institutional legislature of its authority under the U.S. Constitution to decide 
who to appoint to the U.S. Senate, nor transfer such authority to the exclusive 
discretion of some other body—including the people themselves.414  This 
history can be informative in understanding legislatures’ prerogatives 
concerning modern federal elections. 
Professor Muller further explains that the Elections Clause grants 
Congress the same authority to regulate congressional elections as it confers 
on state legislatures.415  Congress’s power under that provision cannot be 
irrevocably transferred to some other entity; the Constitution’s grants of 
authority to state legislatures should be afforded the same protection.416 
Yet again, the majority in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 
rejected this interpretation.  The Court held that a state constitution may 
completely exclude the state’s institutional legislature from drawing 
congressional district lines and instead confer that authority exclusively on 
an independent redistricting commission.417  In other words, a state 
constitution may not only limit how an institutional legislature regulates 
federal elections,418 but completely prohibit the legislature from exercising 
such power at all.  Although Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 
dealt solely with the power to establish congressional district boundaries, the 
Court’s reasoning would extend equally to all other aspects of federal 
elections.419  “Nothing in the opinion turned on the fact that the commission 
was empowered to determine congressional district boundaries, as opposed 
to regulating other aspects of federal elections.”420  The Court’s ruling 
appears to allow a state constitutional amendment—including amendments 
adopted through the public initiative process421—completely transferring 
responsibility for determining the “Times, Places and Manner” of 
congressional elections, as well as the “Manner” of appointing presidential 
electors, from the institutional legislature to some other newly created entity. 
Thus, under current law, a state constitution may partly or completely 
exclude the institutional state legislature from regulating federal elections.  
This is another aspect of Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission that 
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is hard to square with the Constitution’s delegation of authority over federal 
elections specifically to the “Legislature” of each state. 
D.  Delegation of Legislative Authority over Federal Elections 
A final potential implication of the doctrine—though one without merit—
is that the institutional legislature cannot choose to delegate its authority to 
regulate federal elections.  Under this interpretation, because the Constitution 
grants power to regulate federal elections specifically to the legislature, the 
legislature itself—however that term is defined422—must exercise that 
authority, rather than granting executive officials or others the authority to 
establish rules for federal elections.  This approach is inconsistent with how 
the Court has consistently construed other grants of constitutional authority. 
Under the “nondelegation doctrine,” when the Constitution grants 
legislative authority to Congress, Congress may delegate power to 
promulgate regulations to executive officials.  The only constitutional 
constraint is that Congress must provide an “intelligible principle to which 
the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed 
to conform.”423  This forgiving standard is satisfied so long as Congress 
“clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, 
and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”424  Moreover, “well-defined 
practices” and “well-known and generally accepted standards” may 
implicitly guide and limit otherwise standardless grants of discretion.425  
Throughout our nation’s history, the Court has invalidated only two grants of 
legislative authority to the executive branch, both in 1935.426  Since then, the 
Court has upheld a wide range of extraordinarily vague delegations to 
executive agencies, including the authority to determine whether granting a 
broadcasting license was in the “public interest, convenience, or 
necessity”;427 commodity prices were “generally fair and equitable”;428 and 
price caps429 or railroad leases430 were in the “public interest.” 
Courts should interpret the grants of authority to state legislatures through 
the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause the same way they 
interpret the Constitution’s grants of legislative authority to Congress.431  
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Indeed, Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause is coextensive with 
legislatures’ power.432  Legislatures should have the same prerogative as 
Congress to delegate the powers that the Constitution grants them, subject 
only to the outer bounds of the nondelegation doctrine.  Numerous state 
constitutions generally apply stricter nondelegation doctrines to their 
legislatures.433  The U.S. Constitution’s more flexible nondelegation 
doctrine, rather than this stricter standard, should apply to state laws that 
solely govern congressional or presidential elections, since such laws are 
enacted under the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause rather 
than the state constitution.  State laws that broadly apply to elections for 
offices at all levels of government, in contrast, should have to satisfy both 
federal and state nondelegation standards.434  Thus, most state election laws 
would have to satisfy both federal and state nondelegation standards. 
In Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Court properly 
recognized that state legislatures may delegate their authority over federal 
elections.435  Many lower courts have likewise held that legislatures may 
delegate power to regulate various aspects of the electoral process, 
particularly when faced with emergency situations like the COVID-19 
pandemic.436  The independent state legislature doctrine should not be 
construed as precluding revokable delegations of legislative authority to 
executive officials to faithfully implement the legislature’s standards and 
directives. 
CONCLUSION 
If courts were to adopt or reinvigorate certain aspects of the independent 
state legislature doctrine, procedural hurdles would inevitably arise.  For 
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example, the Supreme Court held in Lance v. Coffman437 that individual 
plaintiffs generally lack standing to challenge election officials’ actions on 
the grounds they violate the Elections Clause.438  The ruling arose in a 
challenge to the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision to replace a 
congressional redistricting plan adopted by the state legislature with one that 
had been previously crafted by a state court.439  Four Colorado citizens sued 
in federal court, claiming that the Colorado Supreme Court’s order violated 
the Elections Clause, which grants to the state legislature, rather than to the 
state judiciary, the authority to draw congressional districts.440 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a terse but unanimous per curiam opinion, 
held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claim.441  The Court 
explained that the Colorado Supreme Court’s alleged violation of the 
Elections Clause gave rise only to an “undifferentiated, generalized 
grievance about the conduct of government.”442  It further noted that previous 
cases which it had adjudicated under the Elections Clause had been “filed by 
a relator on behalf of the State rather than private citizens acting on their own 
behalf.”443  Several lower courts invoked Lance to dismiss as nonjusticiable 
challenges concerning the 2020 election that were brought under the 
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause.444 
The Lance Court may have adopted an unduly parsimonious view of 
standing.  In FEC v. Akins,445 the Court properly recognized that an injury 
does not become a generalized grievance simply because it simultaneously 
harms numerous people in the same way.446  Rather, a harm is relegated to 
the status of a generalized grievance only when it is “of an abstract and 
indefinite nature—for example, harm to the ‘common concern for obedience 
to law.’”447  The Elections Clause not only protects the institutional 
prerogatives of state legislatures, but also allocates authority for regulating 
federal elections.  Being assigned to what a person believes is a 
disadvantageous congressional district or being required to follow 
undesirable election procedures by the act of a governmental official or entity 
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that lacks proper authority to adopt such measures constitutes a particularized 
and concrete injury sufficient to confer standing.448 
In Bond v. United States,449 the Court held that a person has standing to 
challenge a federal law on the grounds that, “by enacting it, Congress 
exceeded its powers under the Constitution, thus intruding upon the 
sovereignty and authority of the States.”450  The Court explained that 
individuals who have suffered injury from governmental action have 
standing to contend that such action was taken in violation of the 
Constitution’s structural principles like federalism451 and separation of 
powers.452  These structural concepts protect the prerogatives of certain 
governmental entities not for their own sake, but as a means of protecting 
individual rights.453  From this perspective, the Elections Clause and 
Presidential Electors Clause protect not only the prerogative of state 
legislatures to regulate federal elections but also the right of the people to 
vote in federal elections structured by their duly elected representatives, 
whether in the state legislature or Congress.454  The Eighth Circuit embraced 
this view in Carson v. Simon,455 though as mentioned earlier, other courts 
adjudicating challenges to the 2020 presidential election disagreed.456 
When a justiciable case arises, the Court will have to decide whether and 
how to recognize the independent state legislature doctrine.  As this Article 
demonstrates, the doctrine is not a single, unitary concept but rather a basic 
principle that has a range of potential applications.  As an initial matter, the 
Court should refuse to view the doctrine as imposing a jurisdictional limit on 
federal courts that renders certain types of constitutional challenges to 
election laws nonjusticiable political questions.457  Consistent with current 
precedent, the Court should likewise reject claims that the doctrine prevents 
state constitutions from regulating the legislative process through which 
institutional state legislatures adopt laws governing federal elections,458 such 
as by subjecting such measures to the possibility of a gubernatorial veto459 
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or public referendum.460  And, as Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission recognized,461 a legislature may delegate its authority to other 
entities to assist in regulating elections.462 
It is reasonably debatable, however, whether the Constitution’s grants of 
power specifically to the “Legislature” to regulate federal elections refer 
exclusively to the institutional legislature463 or may also include other 
sources of legislative power that a state constitution recognizes, like the 
public initiative process.464  At a minimum, the Constitution’s express grants 
of authority to the legislature of each state465 should mean that a state may 
not completely exclude its institutional legislature from regulating federal 
elections, or even particular aspects of such elections like congressional 
redistricting.466  Likewise, state officials must be able to point to some 
statutory source of authority when promulgating rules or procedures 
concerning federal elections.467 
The doctrine’s final potential implications are likely the most 
controversial.  The Constitution’s delegation of authority specifically to the 
“Legislature” may impose outer limits on the extent to which state courts can 
adopt unexpected, implausible interpretations of state election laws 
governing federal elections.468  When a state court’s interpretation of an 
election-related statute substantially deviates from the provision’s text, 
particularly after votes have been cast, there is a risk that the court is 
effectively changing the rules of the process rather than merely interpreting 
them.  Federal courts may have a role in reviewing—deferentially—such 
interpretations to ensure that state courts do not usurp the legislature’s 
constitutional authority. 
Additionally, because state legislatures receive their authority to regulate 
federal elections directly from the U.S. Constitution, it may be that state 
constitutions are incapable of imposing substantive limits on that power.469  
Under this view, state legislatures would remain subject to the implicit 
limitations of the Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause, the 
Constitution’s express restrictions such as the Bill of Rights and voting rights 
amendments, and federal laws such as the Voting Rights Act.470  Since many 
state constitutional provisions either have analogues in the U.S. Constitution, 
or have been construed materially similarly to the U.S. Constitution, the 
practical consequences of this doctrine would be limited.471  The Court could 
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further minimize any potential disruption of adopting this approach by 
treating state constitutional provisions as presumptively valid and 
enforceable with regard to federal elections unless and until a legislature 
chooses to adopt a conflicting statute. 
Finally, the independent state legislature doctrine may impact a 
legislature’s ability to directly appoint presidential electors.  As the Supreme 
Court noted in Bush v. Gore, a legislature may decide to change state law in 
advance of a presidential election so that electors are appointed by the 
legislature itself rather than through a popular election.472  The more 
problematic issue is whether a legislature may appoint its own slate of 
electors even without repealing state laws that provide for popular 
presidential elections and establish a process for certifying the results.  The 
Presidential Electors Clause, as construed in McPherson v. Blacker, grants 
the legislature inalienable plenary power to decide how electors will be 
appointed.473  Neither that clause nor McPherson need be read, however, as 
authorizing a legislature to circumvent or contravene the very laws that the 
legislature itself has enacted to regulate the process of appointing electors by 
adopting its own “competing” slate of electors in addition to the state’s 
statutorily certified slate.  Both the Presidential Election Day Act and the 
Constitution’s Due Process Clause stand as additional barriers to a 
legislature’s extra-statutory appointment of electors.474  Moreover, if a 
legislature purported to submit a slate of electors in violation of state law, 
Congress could reject it under the federal law governing the counting of 
electoral votes.475 
A strong normative case for direct legislative appointment of electors 
exists only when a major disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina, makes it 
impracticable or impossible to conduct, complete, or determine the results of 
a popular presidential election.  The Presidential Election Day Act authorizes 
states to appoint electors after Election Day under such extreme 
circumstances.476  In such rare cases, direct legislative appointment of 
electors may be the only alternative to the state’s complete exclusion from 
the presidential election process.477  Even then, states should avoid 
unnecessary uncertainty and legal disputes by adopting an election 
emergency statute—well in advance of the election—that authorizes the 
legislature to directly appoint electors in such emergencies. 
Thus, the Constitution’s reference to the state “Legislature” in the 
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause has a range of potential 
implications.  Some of those claimed implications are erroneous, 
unsupported by history, and prudentially inadvisable.  Other possible 
applications of the independent state legislature doctrine appear reasonably 
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debatable, while still others may be a persuasive interpretation of the 
Constitution’s text, consistent with historical practice, and normatively 
desirable.  Rather than viewing the doctrine as a unitary whole, courts and 
commentators should separately assess the validity of each potential 
individual strand. 
